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Democratic	partisanship	From	theoretical	ideal	to	empirical	standard		
Lise	Esther	Herman	London	School	of	Economics	and	Political	Science1		Forthcoming,	American	Political	Science	Review		
																																																																													Abstract	
In	 recent	 years,	 a	 number	 of	 scholars	 have	 taken	 parties	 and	 partisanship	 as	 objects	 of	
normative	 theorizing.	 They	 posit	 partisanship	 as	 a	 fundamentally	 democratic	 practice	 and	
develop	 a	model	 of	what	 partisans	 can	 do	 at	 their	 best	 to	 contribute	 to	 liberal	 democracy.	
However,	 the	 standards	 the	 literature	 puts	 forth	 remain	 insufficiently	 specified	 to	 serve	 as	
empirical	 benchmarks.	 This	 article	 further	 conceptualizes	 this	 model	 of	 democratic	
partisanship	 and	 offers	 a	 theoretical	 framework	 within	 which	 to	 empirically	 evaluate	 the	
democratic	merits	of	partisan	discourses.	It	establishes	a	series	of	indicators	for	assessing	the	
extent	to	which	partisan	discourse	displays	two	main	qualities:	cohesiveness	and	respect	 for	
political	 pluralism.	 The	 paper	 then	 discusses	 the	 implications	 of	 using	 this	 theoretical	
framework	as	a	basis	for	empirical	studies,	and	shows	how	the	model	can	thereby	benefit	both	
political	scientists	and	theorists.				 	
																																								 																					1	The	bulk	of	the	research	for	this	paper	was	conducted	in	this	institution.	Contact	email:	lise.herman@sciencespo.fr	Paper	Received:	August	05,	2016;	revised:	May	13,	2017;	accepted:May	28,	2017.		I	 thank	 Russell	Muirhead	 for	 encouraging	me	 to	write	 this	 article	 in	 the	 first	 place,	 as	well	 as	 JonathanWhite,	 Abby	Innes,	EliseRoumeas,Jean-Paul	Herman	and	James	Muldoon	for	their	useful	comments	at	different	steps	of	the	process.	A	previous	version	of	the	article	benefited	from	presentation	at	the	2016	Association	for	Social	and	Political	Philosophy	(ASPP)	 General	 Conference.	 I	 also	 gratefully	 acknowledge	 the	 excellent	 comments	 received	 from	 four	 anonymous	reviewers	and	the	APSR	co-editors		
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Political	parties	are	an	ordinary	object	of	contemporary	criticism.	They	are	commonly	held	responsible	for	many	of	the	worrying	tendencies	that	have	characterized	established	democracies	in	past	decades	(Daalder	2002).	Scholars	have	associated	such	seemingly	contradictory	trends	as	the	 disengagement	 of	 citizens	 from	 mass	 politics	 and	 the	 radicalization	 of	 citizens'	 political	passions	to	the	shortcomings	of	political	parties.	The	vocabulary	of	'cartel'	parties,	for	instance,	is	widely	 used	 by	 political	 scientists	 to	 draw	 parallels	 between	 changes	 in	 the	 appeals	 and	organization	of	political	parties	and	their	growing	incapacity	to	mobilize	citizens	(Katz	and	Mair	2009;	Mair	2003;	Hay	2007).	Following	a	similar	logic,	the	polarization	of	political	parties	in	the	United	States	Congress	has	been	associated	on	the	one	hand	with	growing	citizen	disengagement,	and	 on	 the	 other	 with	 a	 similar	 polarization	 of	 the	 American	 electorate	 along	 partisan	 lines	(Ansolabehere	et	al.	1994;	Adam	and	Maier	2010).		Parties	 are	 being	 criticized	 precisely	 because	 they	 are	 pivotal	 agents	 of	 democratic	government	 (for	 an	 overview,	 see	 Schattschneider	 2009	 [1942];	 Sartori	 1976;	 Kitschelt	 2006).	They	are	present	and	indispensable	at	every	step	of	the	electoral	process,	organizing	and	raising	funds	 for	 campaigns,	 offering	 citizens	 platforms	 capable	 of	 aggregating	 their	 dispersed	preferences,	 and	 translating	electoral	majorities	 into	governing	coalitions.	They	are	also	 central	agents	of	government	 in	democratic	polities,	controlling	 the	political	agenda,	 forming	majorities	in	 Parliament	 to	 support	 the	 government	 in	 power,	 and	 keeping	 majorities	 in	 check	 when	 in	opposition.		If	parties	 fulfil	 such	 irreplaceable	 functions,	 this	also	 implies	 that	 their	 failures	will	have	consequences	 for	 the	 vitality	 of	 modern	 democracy	 (Goodin	 2008).	 While	 a	 vast	 literature	documents	the	democratic	performance	of	political	parties,	party	scholars	have	been	reluctant	to	engage	 with	 contemporary	 democratic	 theory.	 This	 has	 resulted	 in	 a	 body	 of	 work	 that	 is	generally	under-theorized,	and	which	tends	to	overlook	some	of	the	central	affective	and	symbolic	functions	 that	 parties	 perform	 (van	 Biezen	 and	 Saward	 2008).	 This	 paper	 responds	 to	 these	challenges	 with	 a	 model	 of	 democratic	 partisanship	 amenable	 to	 empirical	 study.	 My	 starting	point	 is	a	recent	body	of	democratic	 theory	 that	 takes	partisanship	as	 its	main	object,	and	 from	which	I	derive	a	number	of	standards	for	democratic	partisanship.	For	the	purpose	of	this	article,	I	define	 partisanship	as	 the	 routinized	 practices	 and	 discourses	 of	 the	 supporters,	members	 and	leaders	of	a	particular	party	in	support	of	a	shared	conception	of	the	public	good.2	Partisanship	is	
democratic	 when	 these	 routinized	 practices	 and	 discourses	 contribute	 to	 liberal	 democracy,	understood	as	a	system	of	limited	representative	government	that	ensures	both	popular	self-rule																																									 																					2	As	emphasized	by	White	and	Ypi,	partisanship	conceived	as	the	"collective	will	of	partisans"	can	exist	without	a	party	structure	at	its	centre	(White	and	Ypi	2016,	23).	For	the	purpose	of	this	article,	I	focus	on	those	more	easily	identifiable	communities	 that	 find	 an	 organizational	 expression	 and	 are	 thus	 tied	 together	 by	 party	 support,	 membership	 or	leadership.			
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and	respect	 for	minority	rights.	The	set	of	specific	 indicators	 that	 this	article	develops	serves	to	empirically	evaluate	the	democratic	merits	of	partisan	discourse	more	specifically.	In	what	follows,	I	will	first	discuss	the	lack	of	engagement	of	party	studies	with	democratic	theory,	and	how	existing	theories	of	partisanship	are	either	insufficiently	refined	or	insufficiently	comprehensive	to	empirically	evaluate	the	democratic	merits	of	partisan	discourses	and	practices	on	their	basis.	In	the	second	part	of	this	paper,	I	further	conceptualize	these	theories	and	focus	on	two	 main	 characteristics	 that	 the	 literature	 ascribes	 to	 democratic	 forms	 of	 partisanship:	
cohesiveness	and	respect	for	political	pluralism.	Starting	from	these	two	general	concepts,	I	derive	a	series	of	more	specific	indicators	that	can	serve	to	evaluate	the	extent	to	which	the	discourses	of	real-world	 partisans	meet	 these	 normative	 ideals.	 The	 last	 section	 of	 the	 paper	 illustrates	 how	this	 theoretical	 framework	can	be	applied	 in	empirical	 studies	of	partisan	discourse.	 I	 conclude	with	discussing	what	party	studies	can	gain	from	using	the	set	of	indicators	this	article	provides,	and	how	this	model	of	democratic	partisanship	opens	avenues	for	future	normative	theorizing.			
THE	GAP	BETWEEN	PARTY	STUDIES	AND	CONTEMPORARY	DEMOCRATIC	THEORY	
Studying	the	democratic	performance	of	political	parties	The	 vast	 literature	 documenting	 the	 democratic	 performance	 of	 political	 parties	 can	 be	divided	 into	 four	 bodies	 of	 research.	 The	 first	 focuses	 on	 democratic	 consolidation	 in	 newly	formed	 democracies,	 and	 assumes	 that	 party	 system	 institutionalization,	 and	 therefore	 the	emergence	 of	 relatively	 regular	 patterns	 of	 partisan	 competition,	 is	 symptomatic	 of	 democratic	health.	Common	indicators	include	decreases	in	electoral	volatility	and	in	the	number	of	parties	in	competition	(see	for	instance	Sikk	2005;	Casal	Bértoa	and	Mair	2010).	A	second,	related	approach	considers	 the	 ability	 of	 parties	 to	 draw	 on	 a	well-defined	 and	 reliable	 electoral	 basis	 and	 their	responsiveness	to	voter	demands.	Survey-based	and	electoral	studies	allow	to	analyse	the	socio-demographic	and	attitudinal	traits	of	the	electorates	of	different	parties,	and	estimate	the	stability	of	parties'	electoral	bases	over	time	(see	for	instance	Kitschelt	et	al.	1999;	Dalton	et	al.	1984).	A	third	strand	in	the	literature	evaluates	the	democratic	performance	of	parties	on	the	basis	of	the	support	provided	by	citizens.	In	this	instance,	scholars	use	survey-based	indicators	that	estimate	citizens'	 trust	 in	political	parties,	 the	strength	of	citizens'	partisan	 identification,	or	quantitative	data	on	party	membership	(see	 for	 instance	Dalton	and	Wattenberg	2000;	Biezen	and	Poguntke	2014;	Mair	2006).	Finally,	another	branch	of	study	focuses	on	the	coherence	of	the	programmatic	content	of	party	platforms,	relying	on	elite	surveys,	expert	surveys	or	process-tracing	as	a	basis	for	assessment	(see	for	instance	Haughton	and	Fisher	2008;	Kitschelt	and	Smyth	2002).	
Lise	Herman,	Forthcoming,	American	Political	Science	Review	
4	
These	accounts	of	contemporary	partisanship	are	in	essence	normative:	political	scientists	do	not	simply	describe	what	 is,	but	 instead	critically	examine	partisan	practices	 in	 light	of	what	they	believe	ought	to	be.	As	explained	by	Skinner,	democracy	is	always	an	"evaluative-descriptive"	term.	To	use	this	term	is	"not	only	to	describe	the	state	of	affairs,	but	also	(and	eo	ipso)	to	perform	the	 speech-act	 of	 commending	 it"	 (Skinner	 1973,	 298).	 Despite	 this	 normative	 dimension,	 the	party	 literature	 rarely	 engages	 with	 contemporary	 political	 theory,	 and	 normative	 democratic	theory	especially	(for	an	overview,	see	van	Biezen	and	Saward	2008;	Allern	and	Pedersen	2007;	Shapiro	2002;	Katz	2006).3	Much	of	 the	empirical	work	on	political	parties	relies	 instead	on	the	minimalist	 theories	 of	 democracy	 that	 flourished	 in	 the	 1950s	 and	 1960s,	 which	 claim	 to	 not	employ	 normative	 standards	 (see	 for	 instance	 Downs	 1957;	 Dahl	 1956;	 Eckstein	 1961;	Schumpeter	1956	[1942];	for	a	critical	overview,	see	Pateman	2007	[1970];	Skinner	1973).	This	results	in	a	literature	on	political	parties	that	presents	itself	as	engaging	with	facts	and	description,	rather	than	values	and	prescription	(Gerring	and	Yesnowitz	2006,	103).		There	are	several	reasons	why	party	studies	would	benefit	from	engaging	with	normative	political	theory.	First,	it	would	add	academic	rigor	and	transparency	to	this	literature.	Because	the	minimalist	 outlook	 on	 democracy	 is	 so	 widely	 endorsed,	 it	 constitutes	 most	 often	 an	 implicit	theoretical	 framework	 that	 is	 not	 itself	 subject	 to	 falsification	 (Shapiro	 and	 Green	 1994).	 As	 a	result,	the	choice	of	indicators	used	to	evaluate	parties'	democratic	merits	in	these	studies	often	lacks	 thorough	 justification.	A	more	solid	engagement	with	democratic	 theory	would	encourage	political	scientists	to	make	explicit	the	reasons	why	they	ascribe	the	adjective	'democratic'	to	the	practices	of	political	parties,	or	to	their	consequences.		Second,	as	further	discussed	in	the	conclusion	to	this	paper,	engaging	with	contemporary	democratic	 theory	 would	 provide	 scholars	 of	 political	 parties	 with	 new	 avenues	 for	 political	research.	Minimalist	democratic	theory	has	shaped	the	ways	in	which	parties	have	been	studied:	as	 institutions	 of	 the	 state	 and	 electoral	 machines	 rather	 than	 as	 intermediary	 institutions	performing	affective	and	symbolic	 functions	within	civil	society	(Kitschelt	2010;	van	Biezen	and	Saward	2008).	With	a	framework	where	political	parties	are	conceived	"merely	[as]	coalitions	of	individuals	seeking	to	control	government",	their	values	and	policies	serve	first	and	foremost	"to	maximise	 their	 share	of	 the	popular	vote,	 or	 to	perhaps	 create	a	minimum	winning	 coalition	of	parties"	(Vassalo	and	Wilcox	2006,	414).	By	relying	on	such	assumptions,	party	scholars	deprive	themselves	of	the	means	to	formulate	theoretically	informed	assessments	of	the	extent	to	which	parties	uphold	democratic	standards	beyond	the	fulfilment	of	minimal	functions.		
																																								 																					3	While	 some	 scholars	 of	 political	 parties,	 such	 as	 Peter	 Mair	 or	 Herbert	 Kitschelt,	 rely	 in	 their	 work	 on	 a	 firmer	theoretical	 basis	 (see	 for	 instance	Freeze	 and	Kitschelt	 2010;	Mair	2013),	 very	 few	explicitly	build	on	 contemporary	developments	in	democratic	theory	(for	an	exception,	see	Allern	and	Pedersen	2007).	
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Theorizing	the	democratic	merits	of	partisanship		In	 the	 past	 decade,	 a	 number	 of	 democratic	 theorists	 have	 taken	 an	 interest	 in	 the	normative	dimension	of	partisanship,	 thereby	making	 a	 first	 step	 towards	bridging	 the	 existing	divide	 between	 contemporary	 democratic	 theory	 and	 party	 studies	 (White	 and	 Ypi	 2010;	Rosenblum	 2008;	 Muirhead	 2006;	 Bonotti	 2012,	 2014;	 White	 2014;	 White	 and	 Ypi	 2011;	Muirhead	 2014;	 Muirhead	 and	 Rosenblum	 2006,	 2012;	 Rosenblum	 2014;	 Wolkenstein	 2016;	White	 and	 Ypi	 2016).	 This	 literature	 contrasts	 with	 minimalist	 theories	 of	 democracy	 which,	albeit	 giving	 a	 strong	 role	 to	 parties,	 define	 them	 narrowly	 as	 coalitions	 of	 self-interested	politicians	competing	to	attract	the	vote	of	rational	citizens	(see	for	instance	Downs	1957).	It	also	differs	from	much	of	deliberative	and	Rawlsian	political	theory,	which	has	until	recently	given	a	rather	 limited	 role	 to	 partisan	 organizations	 (van	 Biezen	 and	 Saward	 2008).	 In	 contrast,	 this	recent	strand	in	democratic	theory	seeks	to	rehabilitate	partisanship	as	a	normative	category,	and	thus	to	account	for	what	'good	partisanship'	entails	in	democratic	societies.		Theorists	of	democratic	partisanship	define	the	nature	and	content	of	the	responsibilities	that	partisans	should	exercise	in	their	political	functions,	thereby	providing	implicit	guidelines	to	appreciate	their	democratic	contribution.	These	responsibilities	can	be	grouped	into	two	distinct	categories.	First,	as	 intermediaries	between	citizens	and	the	state,	political	parties	should	act	as	effective	agents	of	political	representation,	and	thus	justify	their	normative	ideals	and	policies	in	such	a	way	that	citizens	can	engage	with	 them	(White	and	Ypi	2010,	2011;	2016,	8-32;	55-101;	Muirhead	 and	 Rosenblum	 2006,	 104;	 Bonotti	 2011,	 20-22).	 Second,	 partisans	 in	 democratic	societies	are	expected	to	defend	their	own	convictions	with	respect	 to	 the	principles	of	political	pluralism.	To	this	extent,	they	should	renounce	imposing	their	own	viewpoint	on	society	at	large,	and	acknowledge	the	legitimacy	of	other,	rival	claims	to	representation	in	their	own	party	system	(Muirhead	2006,	22-25;	Rosenblum	2008,	362-368;	Bonotti	2011;	White	and	Ypi	2016,	142-164).	These	 accounts	 are	 not	 only	 grounded	 in	 principles	 of	 political	 philosophy,	 but	 in	 an	understanding	of	the	role	that	parties	have	played	in	the	history	of	established	democracies.4		In	the	19th	and	early	20th	century,	party	systems	socialized	the	citizens	of	the	Western	world	into	mass	 democracy,	 and	 contributed	 to	 structure	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 we	 still	 understand	 politics	(Rokkan	and	Lipset	1967;	Campbell	et	al.	1960).	The	gradual	institutionalization	of	party	systems	throughout	the	modern	era	is	also	inseparable	from	the	emergence	of	a	pluralist	worldview	and	the	sidelining	of	monistic	conceptions	of	the	common	good	(Scarrow	2006;	Daalder	2002;	Sartori	1976).	The	theoretical	literature	on	parties	and	partisanship	thus	seeks	to	highlight	the	potential																																									 																					4More	 sparingly,	 some	 authors	 refer	 to	 the	 empirical	 study	 of	 partisanship	 in	 contemporary	 political	 science.	 For	instance,	in	the	third	part	of	On	the	side	of	Angels	Rosenblum	relies	on	empirical	data	on	the	political	engagement	of	self-declared	 independents	 and	 self-declared	 partisans	 to	 demonstrate	 the	 value	 of	 partisanship	 in	 civic	 life	 (Rosenblum	2008,	337-339).	
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of	 actual	 partisanship	 to	 contribute	 to	 liberal	 democracy.	 Both	 philosophical	 principles	 and	historical	insight	serve	to	develop	standards	of	what	partisans	can	do	at	their	best.		The	purpose	of	these	accounts	is	avowedly	normative.	In	other	words,	the	literature	sets	an	 ideal	 that	 real-world	 partisans	 can	 live	 up	 to,	 but	 also	 fail	 to	 uphold.	 Partisanship	 is	 thus	 a	double-edged	 sword	 for	 democracy.	 Parties	 can	 exercise	 their	 power	 for	 the	 best,	 by	 engaging	citizens	 and	 promoting	 political	 pluralism,	 or	 for	 the	worst,	 by	 fuelling	 disengagement	 and	 the	radicalization	 of	 political	 passions.	 These	 theories	 therefore	 form	 a	 basis	 to	 constructively	criticize	 partisans'	 actual	 practices	 and	 discourses.	 Faced	 with	 the	 shortcomings	 of	 real-world	partisans,	we	can	stop	dreaming	of	a	democracy	that	would	work	without	them.	We	are	given	the	theoretical	 means	 to	 ask	 for	 "not	 less	 partisanship,	 but	 better	 partisanship"	 (Muirhead	 2014,	109).5	
Limitations	of	the	existing	theoretical	literature	for	empirical	studies	It	is	relevant	in	this	context	to	examine	empirically	whether	real-world	partisans	actually	display	these	qualities.	A	political	scientist	would	ask:	How	do	we	see	partisan	morality	in	action?	What	 characteristics	 do	 the	 discourse	 and	 practices	 of	 a	 partisan	 that	 effectively	 acts	 as	 an	intermediary	 between	 citizens	 and	 the	 state	 display?	 What	 distinguishes	 partisans	 who	 help	advance	 the	 principle	 of	 political	 pluralism	 from	 those	who	do	 not?	 The	 purpose	 of	 the	 above-mentioned	 body	 of	 normative	 political	 theory,	 however,	 is	 not	 to	 provide	 such	 empirical	standards	but	to	justify	the	democratic	value	of	partisanship.	As	a	result,	democratic	partisanship	is	not	conceptualized	by	these	theorists	in	such	a	way	that	would	allow	for	political	scientists	to	evaluate	the	democratic	merits	of	real-world	partisans.	More	specifically,	 these	theories	present	two	main	limitations	as	a	basis	for	empirical	study:	they	are	insufficiently	refined	and	insufficiently	
comprehensive	 to	act	as	empirical	benchmarks.	 I	 illustrate	 these	points	drawing	on	a	number	of	more	specific	examples	from	the	literature.	First,	 the	 principles	 of	 democratic	 partisanship	 present	 in	 the	 literature	 are	most	 often	insufficiently	refined:	an	exercise	in	operationalization	would	be	necessary	to	evaluate	examples	of	partisan	discourses	and	practices	on	their	basis.	Consider	the	points	that	White	and	Ypi	make	on	 the	 democratic	merits	 of	 partisan	 political	 justification	 (White	 and	 Ypi	 2011;	 2016,	 55-76).	According	to	the	authors,	partisans	are	particularly	well	placed	to	perform	the	function	of	political	justification	so	central	to	democratic	deliberation	for	a	number	of	reasons.	First,	unlike	factions,																																									 																					5	To	insist	on	the	need	for	better	partisanship	runs	counter	a	large	share	of	contemporary	political	theory	and	sociology	which,	confronted	with	the	pathologies	of	contemporary	partisanship,	argue	for	of	a	new	democratic	model	based	on	local	and	transnational	participatory	forms	of	political	activism	(Norris	2002,	1999;	Della	Porta	and	Rucht	2013;	Della	Porta	and	Tarrow	2004;	Warren	2002;	Fung	2012;	Fung	and	Wright	2003).	For	a	rebuttal	of	some	of	these	arguments,	and	a	defence	of	the	idea	that	parties	fulfil	functions	that	social	movements	do	not,	see	White	and	Ypi,	2010.		
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partisans	address	the	political	community	as	a	whole	and	therefore	offer	reasons	to	citizens	that	should	in	principle	be	acceptable	to	all.	Second,	the	circumstances	of	partisan	political	justification	imply	 that	 partisan	 claims	will	 be	 comparative,	 adversarial	 and	 public,	 three	 elements	 that	 are	conducive	 to	 normatively	 robust	 forms	 of	 political	 justification.	While	 the	 authors	 convincingly	show	the	value	of	partisanship	as	a	vehicle	for	political	justification,	these	principles	are	as	such	insufficiently	refined	for	political	scientists	to	assess	the	presence	or	absence	of	democratic	forms	of	partisanship	on	 their	basis.	 It	 is	 certainly	possible	 to	derive	more	specific	criteria	 from	these	principles,	 but	 they	 would	 first	 need	 to	 be	 operationalized	 to	 act	 as	 benchmarks	 for	 partisan	discourses	and	practices.		A	similar	point	can	be	made	concerning	the	question	of	respect	for	political	pluralism,	an	aspect	 of	 democratic	 partisanship	 generally	 conceived	 as	 a	 moral	 disposition.	 According	 to	Rosenblum,	for	instance,	liberal	democracy	does	not	only	depend	on	partisans	complying	with	the	rules	 of	 the	 political	 game,	 but	 instead	 requires	 their	 positive,	 "personal	 identification	 to	 the	system	 of	 regulated	 rivalry",	 the	 exercise	 of	 a	 "political	 self-discipline	 (...)	 made	 moral	 habit"	(Rosenblum	 2008,	 363,	 125).	 This	 is,	 according	 to	 her,	 "the	moral	 distinctiveness	 of	 Party	 ID"	(Rosenblum	2008,	362).	Yet	what	 this	means	 in	 terms	of	 the	political	behaviour	or	discourse	of	specific	partisans	remains	unspecified.	She	provides	categorical	answers	for	extreme	cases,	where	the	empirical	evidence	is	sufficiently	blatant,	emphasizing	for	instance	that	"partisans	do	not	look	to	 liquidate,	 erase	 or	 permanently	 disorganize	 the	 opposition	 or	 represent	 them	 as	 public	enemies"	(Rosenblum	2008,	363).	While	this	is	a	relevant	minimal	benchmark,	it	does	not	give	us	the	means	to	evaluate	a	wealth	of	discourses	and	practices	that	may	run	counter	to	the	principles	of	political	pluralism	without	directly	challenging	democracy's	minimal	institutional	framework.6	In	 other	 words,	 this	 standard	 is	 not	 fine-grained	 enough	 to	 formulate	 nuanced	 judgments	 on	whether	specific	partisan	practices	or	discourses	are	in	line	with	democratic	standards,	and	thus	to	make	 an	 empirical	 distinction	between	partisans	with	 different	 levels	 of	 respect	 for	 political	pluralism.		In	 both	 of	 these	 examples,	 the	 principles	 offered	 are	 also	 insufficiently	comprehensive	 to	allow	 for	 an	 adequate	 assessment	 of	 partisan	 practices	 and	 discourses.	 In	 other	 words,	 the	principles	 of	 democratic	 partisanship	 are	 dispersed	 across	 the	 literature,	with	 no	 single	 author	offering	 a	 comprehensive	 series	 of	 principles	 that	 partisans	 should	 uphold	 to	 be	 considered	 as	democratic.	A	theoretical	model	of	democratic	partisanship	designed	for	the	purpose	of	empirical	study	 would	 need	 to	 go	 beyond	 the	 question	 of	 political	 justification,	 or	 endorsement	 of	 the	principle	 of	 regulated	 rivalry,	 and	 encompass	 other	 dimensions	 of	 the	 normative	 ideal	 of	partisanship.	While	 some	of	 these	dimensions	are	discussed	elsewhere	 in	 the	writings	of	White																																									 																					6	Bonotti	establishes	a	similar,	minimal	benchmark	that	also	raises	these	challenges	(Bonotti	2012,	22;	2011,	20).	
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and	Ypi	on	the	one	hand,	and	Rosenblum	on	the	other,	building	a	theoretical	 framework	for	the	purpose	of	empirical	study	would	require	an	aggregation	of	these	dimensions	in	a	single	model.			
A	THEORETICAL	FRAMEWORK	FOR	STUDYING	DEMOCRATIC	PARTISANSHIP	
	 This	paper	addresses	these	limitations	by	compiling	the	different	attributes	of	democratic	partisanship	scattered	across	the	literature	within	a	single	theoretical	framework	and	specifying	these	 attributes	 to	 make	 them	 amenable	 to	 empirical	 study.	 The	 framework	 thus	 provides	students	of	political	parties	with	a	set	of	 indicators	anchored	in	normative	democratic	theory	to	assess	the	democratic	merits	of	partisanship.	By	partisanship	I	understand	the	array	of	practices	and	discourses	attached	to	party	identification,	membership,	or	leadership	in	support	of	a	shared	conception	 of	 the	 public	 good.	 The	 framework	 adopts	 a	 liberal	 conception	 of	 democracy,	understood	as	a	system	of	limited	representative	government	that	ensures	both	popular	self-rule	and	 respect	 for	minority	 rights.	 The	 routinized	 practices	 and	 discourses	 of	 partisanship	 can	 be	said	 to	 be	 democratic	 when	 they	 make	 a	 distinct	 contribution	 to	 both	 the	 democratic	 and	 the	
liberal	dimensions	of	liberal	democracy.	The	democratic	dimension	relates	to	the	classic	notion	of	popular	 self-rule,	which	 requires	 engagement	of	 citizens	with,	 and	participation	 in,	 the	political	process	 of	 representative	 government.	 The	 liberal	 dimension	 relates	 to	 the	 preservation	 of	minority	rights	and	political	pluralism	in	an	otherwise	majoritarian	system	of	political	decision-making.	The	 empirical	 standards	 I	 put	 forward	 are	designed	 to	 evaluate	 at	what	point	partisan	
discourse	makes	a	contribution	to	these	two	dimensions	of	liberal	democracy.		 The	 relationship	 that	 this	 framework	establishes	between	partisan	discourse	and	 liberal	democracy	 rests	 on	 a	 number	 of	 prior	 assumptions.	 First,	 I	 assign	 a	 creative	 role	 to	 political	representation	in	general,	and	to	the	representative	claims	of	partisans	more	specifically.	In	line	with	 new	 theories	 of	 representation,	 I	 conceive	 of	 political	 representation	 as	 an	 ongoing	interaction	between	representatives	and	constituents	(see	for	instance	Saward	2009,	2010;	Disch	2011;	Dovi	2007;	Urbinati	2006,	2000;	Mansbridge	2003;	Gutmann	and	Thompson	2010,	2012;	Young	2000).	 In	other	words,	partisans	do	not	simply	mirror	the	pre-existent	and	fixed	political	preferences	of	voters,	as	posited	by	principal-agent	approaches	to	political	representation.	Rather,	the	 process	 of	 representation	 is	 one	 in	 which	 the	 identities	 of	 both	 partisans	 and	 citizens	 are	mutually	and	continuously	constituted.7				 Second,	my	approach	is	in	line	with	a	cultural	institutionalist	approach	to	democracy	and	democratic	 consolidation,	 according	 to	 which	 democratic	 norms	 should	 be	 deeply	 entrenched																																									 																					7	A	 'contextualist'	 turn	 in	 public	 opinion,	 political	 psychology	 and	 party	 studies	 is	 providing	 mounting	 empirical	evidence	that	citizens	opinions	and	representation	do	indeed	shift	according	to	the	ways	in	which	political	parties	frame	issues	 (Sniderman	 and	Theriault	 2004;	 Chong	 and	Druckman	 2007;	Druckman	 2004;	 Enyedi	 2005;	 Leon,	Desai,	 and	Tuğal	2015).		
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within	society	for	a	democratic	regime	to	be	sustained	over	time	(Hall	and	Taylor	1996;	Plattner	and	Diamond	1996;	Miller,	White,	and	Heywood	1997;	Dryzek	and	Holmes	2002;	Herman	2016).	The	compliance	of	elites	and	citizens	to	the	rules	of	the	democratic	game	is	dependent	not	only	on	a	well-designed	system	of	institutional	incentives,	but	on	the	fact	that	they	have	internalized	these	rules	 and	 are	 committed	 to	 them.	 This	 squares	 with	 a	 tradition	 in	 political	 philosophy	 that	conceives	of	a	democratic	regime	first	and	foremost	as	a	way	of	life	or	form	of	society	nourished	by	the	ethical	commitments	of	its	members	(Ryn	1978;	Rosenblum	1989;	Kateb	1981;	Galston	2005,	2002;	 Lefort	 1988;	Rosenblum	1998).	 In	 this	 understanding,	 the	 commitment	 of	 citizens	 to	 the	institutions	of	liberal	democracy	provides	the	essential	foundation	for	their	endurance.8			 Starting	 from	 these	 assumptions,	 how	 parties	 choose	 to	 represent	 citizens	 in	 their	discourse	 has	 consequences	 for	 the	 functioning	 of	 liberal	 democracy.	 If	 representation	 is	 a	creative	process,	then	the	position	of	political	parties	in	the	public	sphere—with	privileged	access	to	 financial	 resources,	 media	 attention	 and	 state	 power—lends	 their	 discourse	 a	 considerable	amount	of	influence	on	the	contours	of	public	deliberation.	With	liberal	democracy	conceived	as	a	way	 of	 life,	 nourished	 by	 the	 ethical	 commitments	 of	 its	 members,	 that	 parties	 support	 such	commitments	within	 the	 broader	 public	 becomes	 crucial	 to	 the	 flourishing	 of	 democracy	more	generally.	As	further	developed	in	the	theoretical	framework	itself,	the	discourse	of	partisans	will	thus	 affect	 both	 the	 democratic	 and	 liberal	 dimensions	 of	 liberal	 democracy.	 First,	 partisan	discourse	will	in	part	condition	citizens'	willingness	to	engage	with	political	affairs,	and	thus	more	broadly,	the	extent	to	which	liberal	democracy	approximates	the	ideal	of	popular	self-rule.	Second,	it	 will	 influence	 the	 extent	 of	 citizens'	 support	 for	 the	 principles	 of	minority	 rule	 and	 political	pluralism.		This	is	not	to	say	that	a	democratic	form	of	partisan	discourse	is	sufficient	to	constitute	a	liberal	democracy.	First,	institutions	that	guarantee	political	and	civil	rights	provide	the	necessary	framework	 that	 may	 then	 be	 supported	 or	 undermined	 by	 partisan	 discourse.	 Second,	 the	performative	 power	 of	 partisanship	 is	 necessarily	 exercised	 within	 certain	 limits:	 although	partisans	 occupy	 a	 privileged	 position	 in	 the	 public	 sphere,	 representation	 remains	 a	 creative	
dialogue.	 Parties	 interpret	 and	 draw	 on	 the	 demands	 of	 citizens,	 while	 citizens	 in	 turn	 re-appropriate,	 reject	 or	 validate	 the	 representative	 claims	 of	 political	 parties.	 The	 boundaries	 of	collective	memory,	for	instance,	will	have	a	bearing	on	the	claims	that	find	a	"cultural	resonance"	within	a	given	population,	and	which	partisans	will	adopt	(Gamson	1992,	135;	Saward	2010,	75-
																																								 																					8	As	a	point	of	contrast,	 the	rational-institutionalist	approach	 to	democracy	posits	 that	well-designed	 institutions	and	political	competition	provide	rational	partisans	with	sufficient	incentives	to	comply	with	the	rules	of	the	political	game	(Schmitter	and	Karl	1991;	Przeworski	1999).	The	institutions	of	democracy	understood	in	this	minimal	sense	are	thus	to	 a	 large	 extent	 self-sustaining:	 they	 contain	 within	 themselves	 the	 conditions	 for	 their	 perpetuation,	 and	 are	 not	dependent	on	the	particular	actors	that	occupy	them.	
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77).9	To	 this	 extent,	 while	 partisan	 discourse	 contributes	 to	 the	 consolidation	 of	 democratic	norms	or	to	their	weakening,	it	cannot	create	a	democratic	or	an	undemocratic	society.			 Third,	 the	democratic	 contribution	of	partisan	discourse,	which	 the	 following	 theoretical	framework	 serves	 to	 evaluate,	 does	 not	 operate	 in	 isolation	 from	 partisan	 practice,	 the	 other	central	component	of	partisanship.	The	mode	of	organization	of	political	parties,	their	procedures	of	internal	decision-making	and	the	types	of	decisions	effectively	being	made	by	political	parties	are	all	 likely	 to	set	 limits	 to	 the	democratic	contribution	of	partisans'	discourses.	Partisans	may	adopt	the	rhetoric	of	virtue	but	make	decisions	that	contradict	this	rhetoric.	A	partisan	discourse	devised	 by	 political	 consultants	may	 be	 normatively	 inferior	 to	 an	 identical	 partisan	 discourse	resulting	 from	a	bottom-up	process	of	 internal	deliberation.	Further	 research	will	be	needed	 to	further	develop	standards	for	partisan	practice,	and	establish	how	these	relate	to	the	democratic	quality	of	partisan	discourse.10			 The	 theoretical	 framework	 is	 structured	 around	 the	 two	 main	 characteristics	 that	 the	existing	literature	attributes	to	partisanship	at	its	best.	First,	democratic	partisanship	is	cohesive.	A	 cohesive	 partisan	 discourse	 aggregates	 dispersed	 issues	 of	 political	 relevance	 into	 a	normatively	grounded,	coherent	program	of	government.	Cohesive	parties	offer	citizens	reasons	to	 engage	with	 representative	 politics,	 and	 thus	make	 a	 distinct	 contribution	 to	 the	democratic	dimension	of	liberal	democracy.	Second,	democratic	partisanship	is	pluralist.	A	pluralist	partisan	respects	the	fact	that	there	exists	a	plurality	of	legitimate	interpretations	of	what	constitutes	the	common	good,	and	 that	his	own	 interpretation	cannot	 impose	 itself	on	 the	polity	as	a	whole.	 In	displaying	 such	 respect	 for	 the	 principles	 of	 political	 pluralism,	 parties	 make	 a	 distinct	contribution	 to	 the	 liberal	 dimension	 of	 liberal	 democracy.11	In	 what	 follows,	 I	 establish	 the	attributes	 of	 cohesive	 and	 pluralist	 partisanship	 in	 turn,	 show	 how	 these	 partisan	 qualities	support	different	dimensions	of	liberal	democracy,	and	detail	indicators	that	can	serve	to	evaluate	
																																								 																					9	In	fact,	the	extent	to	which	partisans	uphold	democratic	standards	is	likely	to	be	influenced	by	a	wealth	of	contextual	factors:	times	of	war	or	peace,	the	extent	to	which	the	agency	of	politicians	is	constrained	by	international	organizations,	public	 opinion	 on	 a	 given	 issue,	 the	 particular	 audience	 that	 a	 partisan	 addresses,	 etc.	 The	 theoretical	 framework	offered	here	does	not	take	into	account	these	different	factors,	and	establishes	criteria	to	assert	of	the	normative	value	of	particular	partisan	discourses	all	else	being	equal.	As	emphasized	in	the	conclusion	of	this	paper,	studying	the	weight	of	contextual	factors	on	variations	in	the	democratic	merits	of	partisan	discourse	is	one	important	avenue	of	empirical	research.	On	the	basis	of	this	knowledge,	further	theoretical	work	could	consider	how	contextual	factors	should	enter	into	our	assessment	of	the	democratic	merits	of	particular	partisan	discourses.		10	While	 it	goes	beyond	 the	scope	of	 this	paper	 to	offer	 standards	 to	evaluate	 the	democratic	merits	of	both	partisan	discourse	and	practice,	partisan	practice	 is	 an	expanding	 topic	of	normative	enquiry	within	 the	 theoretical	 literature	(see	for	instance	Wolkenstein	2016;	Teorell	1999;	White	and	Ypi	2016,	209-229;	Wolkenstein	2015).	11	This	 is	 not	 to	 suggest	 an	 absence	 of	 tensions	 between	 the	 qualities	 of	 democratic	 partisanship,	 and	 between	 the	liberal	and	democratic	dimensions	of	 liberal	democracy	more	broadly.	As	emphasized	in	the	conclusion	of	this	paper,	whether	partisan	cohesiveness	and	partisan	pluralism	are	complementary	or	antagonistic	qualities	of	partisanship	is	an	important	question	for	both	the	empirical	political	sciences	and	for	future	theoretical	work	on	democratic	partisanship.		
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whether	particular	partisan	discourses	display	these	attributes.12	
Cohesive	partisanship:	Sustaining	the	democratic	dimension	of	liberal	democracy	The	literature	on	parties	and	partisanship	offers	reasons	for	why	parties	may	be	unique	in	their	 capacity	 to	 further	 the	 engagement	 of	 citizens	 with	 public	 life.	 Civic	 engagement	 is	understood	 broadly	 here,	 as	 an	 affective	 orientation	 that	 disposes	 individuals	 towards	 feeling	concern	for	the	good	of	their	political	community	and	towards	taking	action	in	order	to	contribute	to	the	common	good	(White	and	Ypi	2010,	809).	While	citizens	delegate	political	responsibilities	to	representatives,	the	involvement	of	constituents	in	the	political	process	is	necessary	to	ensure	that	 political	 leadership	 remains	 accountable.	 Democratic	 representation	 requires	 that	constituents	 organize	 and	 discuss	 issues	 of	 political	 relevance	 in	 anticipation	 of	 upcoming	moments	 of	 authorization,	 and	 discuss	 them	 again	 in	 recollection	 of	 these	 moments	 of	authorization	(Mansbridge	2003;	Young	2000;	Urbinati	2006).	Only	with	the	active	participation	of	the	represented	can	representative	government	claim	to	be	"a	form	of	people's	self-rule"	(Kateb	1981,	371).	Citizens	 engage	 with	 the	 political	 process	 when	 they	 hold	 normatively	 grounded	convictions	 and	 identify	 with	 a	 group	 that	 shares	 these	 convictions.	 A	 citizen	 who	 believes	 in	nothing	 or	 stands	 only	 for	 himself	 will	 not	 engage	 in	 politics	 (Rosenblum	 2008,	 ch.	 7).	 These	conditions	for	political	engagement,	however,	do	not	exist	prior	to	the	process	of	representation.	As	 Muirhead	 emphasizes,	 "somewhere	 the	 variety	 of	 individuals	 sentiments,	 interests	 and	convictions	needs	to	be	collected	(...)	(A)	group	large	enough	to	claim	democratic	legitimacy	does	not	 exist	 spontaneously	 (...)	 It	 must	 be	 created"	 (Muirhead	 2006,	 719).	 The	 'bilingualism'	 of	political	 parties,	 with	 one	 foot	 in	 society	 and	 the	 other	 in	 the	 state,	 puts	 them	 in	 a	 privileged	position	 to	 fulfil	 this	 creative	 role	 (Muirhead	and	Rosenblum	2006,	103).	 	As	 institutions	of	 the	state,	 parties	 have	 access	 to	 financial	 assets,	 media	 attention	 and	 political	 power	 that	 social	movements,	 for	 instance,	 do	 not	 directly	 dispose	 of.	 As	 civil	 society	 organizations,	 parties	 use	these	 resources	 to	mobilize	 existing	members,	 organize	 support	 and	 generate	 new	 sympathies.	
																																								 																					12	The	theoretical	framework	is	concerned	with	establishing	empirical	standards	for	the	study	of	partisan	discourse,	not	the	 intentions	 and	 motivations	 of	 partisans.	 In	 practice,	 these	 are	 likely	 to	 be	 mixed:	 rhetoric	 and	 strategy	 are	consubstantial	 to	 the	 'great	 game	 of	 politics',	 rendering	 any	 conception	 of	 democratic	 partisanship	 as	 'pure	 virtue'	unrealistic	 (Muirhead	 and	 Rosenblum	 2006).	 This	 should	 not	 distract	 from	 the	 fact	 that,	 as	 discussed	 above,	 a	contradiction	between	the	discourse	and	the	practice	of	partisans	would	adversely	affect	the	democratic	contribution	of	a	particular	brand	of	partisanship.		
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They	are	in	a	position	to	create	the	terms	of	contest	and	thus	the	necessary	conditions	for	public	engagement	and	deliberation	over	rival	conceptions	of	the	common	good.13		If	 parties	 are	 among	 those	 institutions	 better	 placed	 to	 generate	 the	 types	 of	 political	convictions	that	push	citizens	to	engage	with	public	life,	they	do	not	necessarily	make	good	use	of	their	privileged	position	in	the	public	sphere.	The	contemporary	disaffection	with	representative	politics	in	established	and	emerging	democracies	is	enough	to	demonstrate	that	parties	can	fail	to	perform	 their	 function	 of	mobilization	 (for	 detailed	 accounts,	 see	Mair	 2006;	Hay	 2007).	 Given	that	parties	have	a	unique	responsibility	in	generating	political	loyalties,	 it	remains	necessary	to	isolate	 the	 conditions	 under	 which	 they	 can	 effectively	 do	 so.	 The	 general	 argument	 made	 by	contemporary	theories	of	partisanship	is	that	parties	should	display	a	form	of	cohesiveness	in	their	claims	 to	 represent	 citizens,	 and	 thus	 campaign	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 a	 discourse	 that	 aggregates	dispersed	 issues	 of	 political	 relevance	 into	 a	 normatively	 grounded,	 coherent	 program	 of	government.14	In	 the	 following	 sections,	 I	 draw	 on	 normative	 political	 theory	 to	 isolate	 three	attributes	 of	 partisan	 cohesiveness,	 and	 further	 operationalize	 indicators	 that	 could	 serve	 to	evaluate	whether	partisan	discourse	meets	these	conditions.		
Attribute	A:	Justifying	political	action	according	to	a	vision	of	the	common	good	
The	first	characteristic	of	partisan	cohesiveness	is	that	political	parties	provide	an	account	to	 the	 political	 community	 of	 the	 ends	 that	 justify	 the	 exercise	 of	 political	 power	 and	 of	 the	principles	 that	underlie	 such	an	exercise.	 It	demands	 from	parties	 that	 they	 stand	 for	a	distinct	vision	 of	 the	 common	 good,	 rooting	 their	 approach	 to	 matters	 of	 common	 concern	 in	 rival	interpretations	 of	 the	 meaning	 of	 fundamental	 principles	 such	 as	 equality	 or	 freedom.	Partisanship	at	its	best	locates	the	particularistic	appeals	of	given	sectors	of	society	in	a	broader	understanding	of	the	political	world,	coherently	connecting	its	different	aspects	across	time,	space,	and	subject	matter.																																										 																					13	As	specified	below,	these	conceptions	of	the	common	good	rest	on	different	interpretation	of	fundamental	principles	such	 as	 liberty	 and	 equality.	 These	 specific	 interpretations	 are	 generally	 informed	by	more	 long-lasting	 traditions	of	political	thought	and	specific	comprehensive	doctrines	such	as,	for	example,	socialism	or	conservatism.	14	One	could	object	to	this	definition	of	partisan	cohesiveness	on	the	ground	that	it	excludes	single-issue	parties,	such	as	the	Australian	HEMP	 (Help	End	Marijuana	Prohibition)	 Party	 or	 the	UK	Animal	Welfare	 Party	 that	may	 sporadically	serve	 to	 engage	 citizens	 that	 would	 not	 otherwise	 participate	 in	 politics.	 This,	 however,	 does	 not	 distract	 from	 the	broader	 point	made	 here.	 One	 of	 the	 values	 of	 democratic	 partisanship	 is	 to	 unite	 a	 community	 of	 citizens	 not	 only	across	different	social	spaces	but	also	across	time,	grounding	political	commitment	in	the	struggle	of	past	generations	and	offering	this	struggle	a	political	future	(White	2015;	White	and	Ypi	2016,	122-142).	As	further	argued	in	this	paper,	such	lasting	political	commitment	to	a	vote-seeking	organization	will	require	cohesiveness,	and	therefore	for	partisans	to	 connect	 a	variety	of	 issues	 together	 in	a	 coherent	narrative,	 and	 to	offer	 citizens	a	program	of	 government	 for	 its	realization.	 The	 empirical	 evidence	 on	 single-issue	 parties	 supports	 this	 normative	 argument.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 the	capacity	for	political	mobilization	of	single-issue	organizations	is	limited	both	in	terms	of	the	numbers	mobilized	and	in	terms	 of	 their	 ability	 to	 sustain	 this	mobilization	 over	 time.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 as	 the	 historical	 evolution	 of	 Green	parties	show,	single-issue	parties	generate	greater	and	more	lasting	commitments	when	they	evolve	towards	cohesive	forms	of	partisanship	and	thus	develop	a	broader	program	around	a	particular	understanding	of	the	common	good.	
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That	 parties	 advance	 such	 understandings	 is	 central	 to	 furthering	 citizens'	 engagement	with	the	political	world.	In	the	words	of	White	and	Ypi,	parties	at	their	best	fulfil	the	'normative'	condition	 for	 political	 engagement:	 they	 provide	 citizens	with	 the	 tools	 to	 formulate	 "a	 critical	appraisal	of	their	joint	political	institutions,	(...)	to	form	judgments	on	matters	of	common	concern	and	to	articulate	such	 judgments	 in	a	way	that	could	appeal	 to	 the	understanding	of	all"	(White	and	Ypi	2010,	811).	By	weaving	individual	concerns	together	in	an	overarching	narrative,	parties	contribute	 to	 citizens	 making	 sense	 of	 their	 own	 grievances	 not	 as	 strictly	 personal	dissatisfactions,	but	as	issues	of	political	relevance.	In	this	sense,	democratic	partisanship	creates	a	 broader	 community	 of	 commitment,	 and	 thus	 opens	 the	 door	 to	 the	 exercise	 of	 collective	political	agency.		This	 attribute	 is	 also	 central	 because	 political	 action	 needs	 to	 be	 justified	 according	 to	some	principles	citizens	can,	if	not	embrace	as	their	own,	at	least	accept	as	reasonable.	Such	acts	of	justification	are	necessary	to	ensure	that	coercive	power	is	being	exercised	in	a	non-arbitrary	fashion,	 and	 more	 generally,	 to	 safeguard	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 the	 decision-making	 process	(Chambers	 2010).	 This	 requires	 that	 parties	 make	 the	 rationale	 that	 motivates	 their	 policies	explicit,	or	in	other	words,	that	they	spell-out	the	values,	interests	and	visions	of	the	'good	society'	their	 legislation	 intends	 to	 further	 (White	 and	 Ypi	 2011;	 Bonotti	 2014).	 Beyond	 the	 role	normative	principles	play	in	legitimizing	political	action,	a	higher	order	of	reasons	is	necessary	for	making	party	programs	and	policies	intelligible	to	citizens	and	to	win	the	support	of	constituents.		To	 evaluate	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 partisan	 discourse	 meets	 this	 normative	 condition	 for	partisan	 cohesiveness,	 political	 scientists	 can	 focus	on	 the	 extent	 to	which	partisans	 justify	 and	account	 for	 specific	 programs	 or	 policies	 in	 terms	 of	 a	 specific	 idea	 of	 the	 common	 good.	 Two	indicators	can	be	considered	here.	First,	partisans	should	express	allegiance	 to	a	supra-partisan	idea	 of	 the	 political	 community,	 which	 includes	 all	 social	 groups	 and	 political	 identities,	 yet	transcends	 them.15	Partisans	 that	display	 this	normative	attribute	of	 cohesiveness	 communicate	that	 their	 loyalty	 to	 the	 demos	 as	 a	 whole	 has	 precedence	 over	 their	 allegiance	 to	 particular	groups	 of	 voters.	 Historically,	 the	 modern	 definition	 of	 the	 party	 emerged	 when	 it	 was	distinguished	from	factionalism,	with	authors	such	as	Edmund	Burke	seeing	the	former	as	aiming	to	further	the	"national	interest"	as	a	whole,	and	the	latter	as	promoting	the	interests	of	particular	
																																								 																					15	The	relevant	political	community	depends	on	the	constituency	that	a	particular	partisan	addresses.	For	a	candidate	to	mayorship,	for	instance,	this	could	be	the	citizens	of	his	town.			
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groups	 in	society	(Burke	1990	[1770],	86;	Sartori	2005	[1976],	3-4).16	Clientelist	appeals	on	the	basis	of	group	belonging	are,	to	this	extent,	at	odds	with	cohesive	partisanship.	
Indicator	 1:	 Cohesive	 partisans	 justify	 particular	 political	 decisions	 and	 policies	 by	
explaining	how	they	benefit	the	political	community	at	large.	In	practice,	this	involves	
that:		 	
-	 Cohesive	 partisans	 designate	 as	 beneficiary	 of	 their	 political	 actions	 the	 relevant	
political	community	at	large,	for	example	'the	Republic',	 'the	people',	 'Londoners',	 'we	
Europeans',	etc.		
-	When	partisans	address	the	needs	of	particular	segments	of	the	population	('workers',	
'entrepreneurs',	 'single	 mothers'),	 they	 explain	 how	 addressing	 these	 particular	
grievances	 furthers	 the	 well	 being	 of	 the	 relevant	 political	 community	 at	 large.	 For	
instance,	a	party	could	defend	 the	 interests	of	workers	 in	 the	name	of	advancing	 the	
cause	of	a	fairer	society.		Second,	 to	 advance	 a	 certain	 vision	 of	 the	 common	good,	 parties	 should	 refer	 to	 shared	societal	objectives	and	political	values	that	transcend	particular	group	interests	and	convictions.	Two	 separate	 components	 of	 this	 shared	 space	 are	 particularly	 relevant	 here.	 First,	 partisans	should	 insist	 on	 'matters	 of	 common	 concern',	 issues	 that	 should	 be	 considered	 collectively	because	they	result	from	social	linkage.	The	health,	education	and	security	of	citizens	may	be	seen,	for	 instance,	 as	 'common	 goods',	 and	 are	 among	 the	 societal	 objectives	 that	 cohesive	 partisans	wish	 to	 achieve	 regardless	 of	 their	 position	 on	 the	 political	 spectrum	 (Galston	 2013).	 This	normative	attribute	of	cohesiveness	also	requires	partisans	to	establish	the	relative	importance	of	these	objectives	according	to	their	particular	conception	of	the	common	good.		Partisans	should	also	refer	to	the	fundamental	principles	that	define	the	common	good	at	large.	 Even	 agonistic	 theories	 of	 democracy,	 that	 give	 a	 central	 role	 to	 political	 contestation,	recognize	that	democratic	political	communities	entail	a	"certain	amount	of	consensus"	and	more	specifically,	 "a	 shared	 adhesion	 to	 the	 ethico-political	 principles	 of	 liberal	 democracy"	 (Mouffe	2000,	103).	While	some	of	these	—justice,	equality	or	freedom—	are	common	to	most	democratic	constitutional	 frameworks,	 their	 order	 and	 emphasis	may	 differ	 from	 one	 to	 another.	 Cohesive	partisans	will	 take	these	principles	as	given	and	offer	different	 interpretations	of	their	meaning,	relative	importance	and	implications.	These	particular	interpretations	are	generally	grounded	in	
																																								 																					16	Separationist	parties,	for	instance	the	Scottish	National	Party	campaigning	in	favour	of	the	independence	of	Scotland	from	 the	United	Kingdom,	 are	 borderline	 cases.	 They	 speak	 for	 a	 particular	 group	within	 the	political	 community	 at	large	and,	to	this	extent,	contravene	this	aspect	of	cohesiveness.	However,	this	stance	is	adopted	not	to	defend	special	interests	against	the	common	good,	but	 in	the	perspective	of	renegotiating	the	boundaries	of	the	political	community	itself.		
Lise	Herman,	Forthcoming,	American	Political	Science	Review	
15	
long-lasting	 traditions	 of	 thought	 and	 thus	 informed	 by	 comprehensive	 doctrines	 such	 as,	 for	example,	socialism	or	conservatism.	
Indicator	 2:	 Cohesive	 partisans	 justify	 their	 political	 actions	 by	 referring	 to	 broad	
societal	objectives	and	fundamental	values	that	they	intend	their	actions	to	further.	In	
practice,	this	entails	that:		
-	Cohesive	partisans	make	explicit	how	their	actions	and	policies	will	address	matters	
of	common	concern.	For	instance,	a	partisan	may	justify	reforming	a	 labour	law	as	a	
solution	for	tackling	unemployment.		
-	 Cohesive	 partisans	 make	 explicit	 how	 their	 actions	 and	 policies	 contribute	 to	
advancing	 one	 or	 several	 of	 the	 fundamental	 principles	 that	 ground	 the	 political	
community.	For	instance,	a	conservative	partisan	may	justify	a	law	that	diminishes	the	
legal	 hurdles	 for	 economic	 competition	 in	 the	 name	 of	 furthering	 a	 certain	
interpretation	of	freedom	as	the	absence	of	constraints.		
Attribute	B:	Offering	means	for	the	realization	of	normative	goals		
The	second	attribute	of	a	cohesive	partisan	discourse	is	that	it	provides	citizens	with	the	sense	that	normative	goals	can	effectively	be	realized	through	the	use	of	state	power.	Democratic	partisanship	gives	meaning	to	both	normative	objectives	and	governmental	practices	by	making	their	 connection	 intelligible	 to	 citizens.	 It	 is	 by	 fulfilling	 what	White	 and	 Ypi	 have	 termed	 the	'executive'	condition	for	political	engagement,	and	thus	addressing	particular	grievances	through	policy-making,	that	parties	demonstrate	the	practical	relevance	of	their	normative	commitments	(White	 and	 Ypi	 2010,	 817-8).	 In	 this	 process,	 parties	 demonstrate	 the	 possibility	 for	 citizens'	normative	goals	to	be	realized	through	political	action.	This	is	all	the	more	important	that	parties	are	the	only	political	actors	that	dispose	directly	of	the	coercive	power	and	taxing	capacity	of	the	state.	 While	 social	 movements	 may	 offer	 normative	 objectives,	 their	 limited	 financial	 and	organizational	resources	curtail	the	scope	of	their	actions,	as	they	cannot	enact	direct	changes	in	legislation.	To	 evaluate	 this	 second	 attribute	 of	 partisan	 cohesiveness,	 political	 scientists	 can	 first	focus	on	the	ways	 in	which	partisans	talk	about	their	own	political	agency.	Cohesiveness	entails	that	partisans	will	communicate	 that	 their	actions	have	consequences	and	that	 they	can	make	a	difference,	rather	than	insisting	on	their	lack	of	choice	or	agency	(Hay	2007,	66).	In	this	last	case,	partisans	give	citizens	little	reason	to	believe	that	their	normative	goals	can	be	realized	and	will	likely	breed	resignation	at	best,	animosity	at	worst.	
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Indicator	 3:	 Cohesiveness	 entails	 that	 partisans	 demonstrate	 their	 ability	 to	 exercise	
their	political	agency	in	their	discourse.	In	practice,	this	means	that:		
-	 They	 present	 specific	 political	 actions	 as	 resulting	 from	 a	 political	 choice	 between	
alternatives	that	can	be	justified	from	a	normative	perspective	(see	Indicator	2).		
-	 	 They	 refrain	 from	 presenting	 specific	 political	 actions	 as	 the	 only	 possible	 choice	
available	 to	 governments,	 for	 instance	 as	 a	 decision	 solely	 dictated	 by	 external	
factors.17		 A	 second	 requirement	 for	 partisans	 to	 display	 this	 attribute	 is	 that	 they	 clearly	 outline	their	 programmatic	 orientations	 and	 specific	 policy	 proposals.	 Normative	 thinking	 without	political	 practice	 is	 insufficient	 to	 engage	 citizens	 with	 the	 political	 process.	 One	 of	 the	contributions	 of	 cohesive	 partisans	 will	 therefore	 be	 that	 they	 can	 explain	 how	 they	 intend	 to	further	 their	 particular	 conception	 of	 the	 common	 good	 and	 thus	 provide	 citizens	with	 a	well-defined	bundle	of	policies	and	measures.	
Indicator	 4:	 Cohesive	 partisans	 explain	 how	 they	 intend	 to	 further	 their	 particular	
conception	 of	 the	 common	 good	with	 their	 actions	 in	 government.	 In	 practice	 this	
entails	that:		
-	When	campaigning,	cohesive	partisans	present	a	well-defined	bundle	of	policies	and	
measures	that	makes	for	a	clear	program	of	government.	For	instance,	a	conservative	
partisan	 who	 defends	 a	 negative	 conception	 of	 freedom	 will	 not	 solely	 vouch	 to	
liberalize	the	job	market,	but	suggest	a	series	of	specific	measures	of	liberalization.		
-	When	 in	government,	partisans	show	how	their	measures	and	policies	will	 impact	
the	 political	 community	 in	 a	 way	 that	 furthers	 their	 specific	 conception	 of	 the	
common	good.	For	instance,	a	conservative	partisan	may	show	how	specific	measures	
of	market	 liberalization	will	 impact	society	and	the	economy	in	a	way	that	furthers	
his	vision	of	the	good	society.			
Attribute	C:	Distinguishing	normative	goals	and	policies	from	those	of	opponents	
Finally,	for	partisan	discourse	to	be	cohesive	it	should	be	differentiated	from	the	discourse	of	 opponents.	 In	 other	words,	 parties	 need	 to	 offer	 citizens	distinct	 normative	 goals	 and	 policy	proposals.	This	is	essential	for	citizens'	engagement	with	the	political	process	for	several	reasons.	First,	 positioning	 with	 regard	 to	 a	 political	 'other'	 is	 necessary	 for	 parties	 to	 assert	 their	 own	commitments,	 and	 to	 mobilize	 citizens	 on	 their	 basis.	 This	 squares	 with	 the	 post-structuralist																																									 																					17	To	 this	 extent,	 a	 highly	 constrained	 environment	 of	 policy-making	 is	 likely	 to	 adversely	 affect	 the	 cohesiveness	 of	partisan	claims	and,	further,	the	political	engagement	of	citizens.		
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notion	of	a	'constitutive	outside',	according	to	which	all	forms	of	identity	can	only	be	constructed	through	 differentiation	 (Mouffe	 2000,	 33).	 Partisan	 identities	 strong	 enough	 to	 mobilize	 civic	passions	are	thus	adversarial	in	nature:	they	define	themselves	not	only	with	regard	to	what	they	are,	but	also	with	regard	to	how	they	diverge	from	other	partisan	identities.	More	generally,	the	attachment	of	voters	to	particular	parties	only	makes	sense	where	such	differences	exist	and	are	asserted.		The	most	 straightforward	 case	 to	be	made	 in	 favour	of	partisan	differentiation	 is	 that	 it	offers	citizens	a	meaningful	choice	between	political	alternatives.	This	idea	has	been	at	the	core	of	minimalist	theories	of	democracy,	which	cast	the	free	competition	of	political	parties	for	citizens'	votes	 as	 a	 defining	 feature	 of	 the	 democratic	 regime	 (Downs	 1957;	 Schumpeter	 1956	 [1942];	Przeworski	1999).	It	also	echoes	the	classic	ideal	of	'responsible	party	government',	according	to	which	 citizens	 can	 only	 hold	 parties	 accountable	 if	 these	 spell-out	 clear	 alternatives	 of	government	 (Schattschneider	 2009	 [1942];	 American	 Political	 Science	 Association	 1950;	 Mair	2013).	Only	when	offered	a	plurality	of	options	can	voters	find	an	alternative	closer	to	their	own	interests	 and	 choose	 a	 different	 majority	 at	 the	 next	 elections	 if	 their	 expectations	 are	disappointed.	From	the	perspective	of	studying	partisan	discourse,	the	extent	to	which	partisans	justify	their	 claim	 to	 the	 exercise	 of	 political	 power	 in	 a	 comparative	 fashion	 is	 a	 good	 indicator	 for	partisan	differentiation.	Partisans	in	government	will	be	tempted	to	ignore	the	current	opposition	and	 focus	 only	 on	 their	 own	 program,	 while	 partisans	 in	 opposition	 will	 tend	 to	 criticize	 the	government	without	making	 clear	what	 policies	 and	measures	 it	would	 enact	 in	 its	 place.	 Both	should	 instead	 adopt	 a	 comparative	 form	 of	 political	 justification,	 and	 show	 how	 their	 own	conception	 of	 the	 common	 good	 and	 policies	 are	 preferable	 to	 the	 alternative	 suggested	 by	opponents	(White	and	Ypi	2011,	385;	Hofstadter	1969,	4).		
Indicator	 5:	 Cohesive	 partisans	 justify	 their	 claims	 to	 political	 power	 in	 a	
comparative	fashion.	In	practice,	this	entails	that:		
-	 In	opposition,	partisans	not	only	criticize	the	policies	and	particular	conception	of	
the	 common	 good	 of	 the	 party	 in	 government,	 but	 also	 outline	 how	 their	 own	
conception	of	the	common	good	differs	and	what	their	own	party	would	do	in	place	of	
their	opponents.			
-	 In	government,	partisans	not	only	defend	their	own	policies	and	conception	of	 the	
common	good,	but	outline	in	the	process	how	these	differ	from	those	defended	by	past	
governments	and	the	current	opposition.			
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Pluralist	partisanship:	Sustaining	the	liberal	dimension	of	liberal	democracy		I	 now	 turn	 to	 the	 second	 main	 characteristic	 for	 democratic	 partisanship:	 	 respect	 for	political	pluralism.	Respecting	political	pluralism	means	 that	 the	discourses	of	partisans	will	be	aligned	with	the	worldview	according	to	which	there	may	exist	reasonable	disagreement	over	the	interpretation	 to	 be	 given	 to	 the	 common	 good,	 and	 over	 the	means	 to	 reach	 it.	 Implicitly,	 this	entails	 a	 recognition	 that	 "there	 is	 no	 single,	 univocal	 summum	 bonum	 that	 can	 be	 defined	philosophically,	let	alone	imposed	politically"	(Galston	2002,	30).	Pluralist	partisans	defend	their	position,	 seeking	 to	 persuade	 others	 but	 never	 to	 impose	 their	 views.	 They	 argue	 for	 the	superiority	of	their	claims,	but	do	not	assert	that	these	are	the	only	legitimate	claims	that	can	be	defended.	With	such	attitudes,	they	accept	that	their	party	represents	only	part	of	the	polity	and	thus	pursue	their	particular	goals	"without	threatening	the	fundamental	values	and	institutions	of	the	 framework	 itself"	 (Sartori	 1976,	 16).	 This	 quality	 is	 central	 to	 a	 number	 of	 theories	 of	partisanship	(see	for	instance	Muirhead	2006,	22-25;	Rosenblum	2008,	362-368;	Bonotti	2011).	This	form	of	respect	is	necessary	for	partisans	to	support	the	liberal	dimension	of	liberal	democracy,	 and	 thus	 the	 preservation	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 and	 minority	 rights	 in	 an	 otherwise	majoritarian	system	of	political	decision-making.	If	pluralist	partisanship	is	particularly	important	in	this	regard,	it	is	precisely	because	parties	are	central	actors	of	representative	government	with	a	unique	position	between	civil	society	and	the	state.	Their	privileged	access	to	coercive	power,	financial	 resources	 and	media	 attention	 lends	 them	 a	 considerable	 amount	 of	 influence	 on	 the	contours	 of	 public	 opinion	 and	 on	 the	 continued	 integrity	 of	 democratic	 institutions.	 When	partisans	mobilize	 citizens	on	 the	basis	of	monistic	appeals	or	berate	democratic	procedures	 in	their	 discourse,	 they	 also	 erode	 the	 norms	 that,	 as	 emphasised	 earlier	 in	 this	 article,	 sustain	liberal	democracy	as	a	way	of	life	(Ryn	1978;	Mouffe	2000;	Lefort	1988;	Bevir	and	Rhodes	2010).	In	 this	 case,	 democracy's	 formalized	 rules	 and	 procedures	 are	 also	 far	 more	 vulnerable	 and	susceptible	to	being	undermined	(Herman	2016).	In	the	following	sections,	I	draw	on	normative	political	theory	to	isolate	three	attributes	of	pluralist	partisanship	and	explain	why	these	particular	traits	contribute	to	sustaining	the	liberal	dimension	of	 liberal	 democracy.	 For	 each	 condition,	 I	 further	operationalize	 indicators	 that	 can	serve	to	evaluate	whether	particular	partisan	discourses	are	in	line	with	a	pluralist	conception	of	the	political	community.		
Attribute	D:	Treating	opponents	as	moral	agents	
Pluralist	partisanship	first	involves	that	partisans	treat	their	political	opponents	as	moral	agents,	and	therefore	as	political	actors	that	seek	to	advance	the	good	of	the	political	community.	
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Pluralist	 partisans	 see	 their	 opponents	 as	 committed	 to	 addressing	 widely	 accepted	 societal	problems	(i.e.,	 sickness,	poverty,	 crime)	and	 the	action	of	opponents	as	guided	by	a	concern	 for	fundamental	 principles	 such	 as	 freedom,	 equality	 and	 the	 preservation	 of	 democracy's	'procedural	minimum'	(Galston	2013).	Their	behaviour	should	reflect	 the	 idea	 that	 they	share	a	goal	 with	 their	 adversaries,	 namely	 to	 better	 the	 political	 community,	 and	 that	 despite	 their	divergences	they	have	a	common	good	to	defend.		To	 disagree	 with	 opponents,	 yet	 see	 them	 as	 committed	 to	 the	 common	 good,	 is	 a	fundamentally	 pluralist	 stance.	 It	 amounts	 to	 recognizing	 the	 absence	 of	 an	 authoritative	 and	definitive	 interpretation	 of	 what	 constitutes	 the	 common	 good.	 As	 Gutmann	 and	 Thomson	emphasize,	to	"treat	(an	opponent's)	position	as	expressing	a	moral	rather	than	a	purely	strategic,	political	 or	 economic	 view"	 also	 involves	 to	 recognize	 that	 this	 position	 "is	 based	 on	 moral	principles	about	which	people	may	reasonably	disagree"	(Gutmann	and	Thompson	1996,	82).	In	the	face	of	a	joint	commitment	to	the	common	good,	pluralist	partisans	attribute	the	persistence	of	political	disagreements	to	different	understandings	of	the	fundamental	principles	that	ground	the	political	community,	and	of	their	practical	implications.	Such	 forms	 of	 respect	 do	 not	 amount	 to	 a	 politically	 naive	 position	 according	 to	which	opponents	 would	 be	 perfectly	 virtuous	 agents	 devoid	 of	 personal	 or	 political	 interests.	Professional	 partisans	 from	 all	 sides	 of	 the	 political	 spectrum	will	 not	 only	 aim	 to	 further	 the	common	 good,	 but	 will	 also	 have	 the	 ambition	 of	 advancing	 their	 political	 career.	 Pluralist	partisans	know	that	 their	opponents	are	partly	motivated	by	self-interest,	but	do	not	 limit	 their	characterization	of	opposition	to	this	trait.	Partisans	who	respect	their	opponents	assume	instead	that	 political	 adversaries	 have	 'mixed-motives',	 and	 thus	 that	 they	 "act	 not	 only	 for	 their	 own	political	 gain	 but	 also	 out	 of	 a	 desire	 to	 do	what	 they	 think	 is	 right"	 (Gutmann	 and	 Thompson	2010).			When	 looking	 for	 empirical	manifestations	 of	 such	 respectful	 attitudes,	 it	 would	 be	 too	demanding	to	expect	from	partisans	that	they	systematically	and	overtly	acknowledge	that	their	opponents	 are	 principled	 and	 oriented	 towards	 the	 common	 good.	 Partisans	 argue	 for	 the	superiority	of	their	own	program,	and	criticize	their	opponents'	platform.	This	is	part	and	parcel	of	 the	 partisan	 enterprise	 and,	 as	 outlined	 earlier,	 differentiation	 is	 a	 necessary	 condition	 for	partisans	 to	 give	 citizens	 reasons	 to	 engage	 with	 politics.	 To	 evaluate	 empirically	 whether	partisans	treat	opponents	as	moral	agents,	it	is	therefore	more	adequate	to	focus	on	the	types	of	criticisms	that	pluralist	partisans	level	against	their	adversaries.	In	the	following	paragraph	I	offer	some	 guidelines	 to	 distinguish	 between	 pluralist	 and	 non-pluralist	 types	 of	 criticisms	 of	opponents.		
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Pluralist	partisans	 will	 first	 refrain	 from	 engaging	 in	 'motive-cynicism'	 when	 criticizing	opponents.	By	this,	I	mean	that	they	do	not	raise	doubts	on	the	moral	integrity	of	their	opponents,	or	on	the	legitimacy	of	the	reasons	for	their	opponents'	political	actions	(Gutmann	and	Thompson	2010,	1133).	Partisans	need	not	ignore	that	their	opponents	strategically	target	voters,	and	that	a	certain	 measure	 of	 corruption	 exists	 within	 most	 political	 organizations.	 But	 if	 the	 motives	 of	those	who	engage	with	politics,	including	their	own,	are	always	mixed,	then	criticizing	opponents	by	questioning	the	integrity	of	their	motives	is	hypocritical	and	destructive	to	the	political	debate.	By	casting	doubts	on	the	reasons	that	motivate	an	opponent	to	say	or	do	something,	partisans	are	also	questioning	whether	their	opponents	act	out	of	concern	for	the	common	good.		
Indicator	6:	Pluralist	partisans	refrain	 from	engaging	 in	 'motive-cynicism'	when	they	
criticize	political	opponents,	and	thus	from	raising	doubts	on	the	integrity	of	political	
opponents	 in	 general,	 or	 on	 the	 reasons	 that	motivate	 their	 opponents	 to	 do	 or	 say	
something	in	particular.	In	practice,	this	entails	that:		
-	Pluralist	partisans	do	not	criticize	the	decisions	of	opponents	on	the	basis	that	these	
are	 solely	 designed	 to	 advance	 their	 political	 interests.	 For	 instance,	 a	 partisan	
criticizing	his	 opponents'	 decision	 to	 raise	 the	minimum	wage	 on	 the	 basis	 that	 it	 is	
motivated	only	by	the	desire	to	gain	votes	would	be	engaging	in	motive-cynicism.		
-	 Pluralist	 partisans	 refrain	 from	 picturing	 the	 decisions	 of	 opponents	 as	 solely	
designed	 to	 advance	 their	 personal	 interests.	 For	 instance,	 a	 partisan	 criticizing	 his	
opponents'	decision	to	lower	taxes	on	wealthy	incomes	on	the	basis	that	it	favours	the	
economic	interests	of	his	own	circle	would	be	engaging	in	motive-cynicism.		
-	Pluralist	partisans	more	broadly	refrain	from	criticizing	opponents	on	the	basis	that	
they	are	fundamentally	immoral	or	uncommitted	to	the	common	good.	For	instance,	a	
partisan	who	would	take	a	corruption	scandal	involving	members	of	his	opposition	as	
an	opportunity	to	label	his	opposition	as	a	whole	as	corrupt,18	or	brand	his	opponents	
as	being	"against	the	nation",	would	be	engaging	in	motive-cynicism.		Instead	 of	 criticizing	 the	 actions	 of	 opponents	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 their	 intentions,	 pluralist	partisans	will	 criticize	 opposing	positions	 and	policies	 on	 the	basis	 of	 their	 own	account	 of	 the	common	 good.	 Pluralist	 partisans	 show	 how,	 in	 light	 of	 their	 own	 understanding	 of	 the	fundamental	 principles	 that	 ground	 the	 community,	 certain	 decisions	 taken	by	 their	 opponents	may	 come	 to	 undermine	 widely	 accepted	 societal	 goods.	 Such	 forms	 of	 criticism	 remain	compatible	with	a	pluralist	understanding	of	the	political	world.	Democratic	partisans	understand	
																																								 																					18	To	this	extent,	a	highly	corrupt	political	environment	is	also	likely	to	affect	the	pluralist	quality	of	partisan	discourse.		
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that	 there	 exists	 a	 plurality	 of	 legitimate	 interpretations	 of	 the	 meaning,	 hierarchy	 and	implications	of	fundamental	principles,	while	taking	a	stand	for	one	such	interpretation.		
Indicator	7:	Pluralist	partisans	will	criticize	their	opponents'	positions	by	highlighting	
their	 limitations	with	regard	to	advancing	the	common	good.	 In	practice,	 this	entails	
that:		
-	 Pluralist	 partisans	 will	 criticize	 the	 decisions	 of	 adversaries	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 their	
limitations	 in	 advancing	 widely	 shared	 societal	 objectives.	 For	 instance,	 a	 partisan	
criticizing	his	opponents'	decision	to	raise	the	minimum	wage	may	do	so	on	the	basis	
that	it	will	stifle	economic	activity,	and	thus	ultimately	citizens'	economic	well-being.	
-	 Pluralist	 partisans	 will	 use	 the	 hierarchy	 they	 establish	 between	 fundamental	
principles	as	a	basis	for	criticizing	the	decisions	of	adversaries.	For	instance,	a	partisan	
criticizing	 his	 opponents'	 decision	 to	 lower	 taxes	 on	 high	 incomes	may	 do	 so	 on	 the	
basis	that	it	compromises	the	rectification	of	inequalities.			
Attribute	E:	Accepting	the	partial	and	temporary	nature	of	political	claims	
Partisans'	 respect	 for	 political	 pluralism	 should	 also	 trump	 their	 desire	 to	 see	 their	particular	views	triumph	and	indefinitely	occupy	the	place	of	political	power.	As	argued	by	Lefort,	the	historical	emergence	of	democracy	stems	from	a	moral	revolution,	"instituted	and	sustained	by	the	dissolution	of	the	markers	of	certainty"	(Lefort	1988,	19).	In	democratic	polities,	the	moral	universe	 becomes	 characterized	 by	 a	 plurality	 of	 legitimate	 claims	 to	 the	 common	 good,	 and	dissent	is	endorsed	as	a	permanent	and	even	beneficial	characteristic	of	the	polity.	Pluralist	 partisans	 therefore	 know	 that	 political	 disagreement	 over	 the	 meaning	 and	
implications	of	common	principles	is	both	ineliminable	in	a	modern	liberal	democracy	and	central	to	its	perpetuation.	They	do	not	question	the	fundamental	moral	indeterminacy	of	democracy	and	accept	 that	 power	 can	 only	 be	 occupied	 for	 a	 limited	 period	 of	 time.	 In	 other	 words,	 pluralist	partisans	 "do	not	want	or	expect	 the	elimination	of	political	 lines	of	division"	precisely	because	they	 are	 committed	 to	 the	 "system	 of	 regulated	 rivalry	 that	 defines	 liberal	 democracy"	(Rosenblum	 2008,	 364;	 362).	 They	 fight,	 while	 accepting	 the	 impossibility	 of	 a	 final	 victory,	without	 aiming	 for	 their	 struggle	 to	 end	 future	 contestation	 and	 bring	 about	 a	 permanent	consensus.		One	would	 especially	 expect	 from	pluralist	 partisans	 that	 they	 refrain	 from	 engaging	 in	
monistic	political	appeals.	In	other	words,	partisans	will	not	picture	the	common	good	as	a	unitary,	immutable	and	uncontroversial	notion	that	 their	party	alone	defends.	Pluralist	partisans	do	not,	for	instance,	claim	any	"mastery	of	the	foundations	of	society",	and	therefore	argue	that	they	alone	
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can	defend	the	democratic	political	community	and	represent	its	fundamental	principles	(Mouffe	2000,	21).	Both	nationalist	and	far-left	forms	of	populism—a	form	of	political	discourse	in	which	the	speaker	claims	to	express	the	people's	will	as	a	unitary	whole—are	by	this	token	incompatible	with	pluralist	forms	of	partisanship.	This	would	also	be	the	case	for	certain	forms	of	technocratic	appeals	that	reduce	politics	to	finding	the	right	means	to	reach	widely	accepted	societal	goals.19		
Indicator	8:	Pluralist	partisans	do	not	engage	in	monistic	political	appeals.	In	practice,	
this	entails	that:		
-	Pluralist	partisans	 refrain	 from	claiming	 that	 their	party	alone	 can	 truly	 represent	
the	political	 community.	 For	 instance,	 a	partisan	who	 claims	 that	 only	his	 party	 can	
speak	 for	 the	 nation	 because	 it	 alone	 defends	 its	 values	 and	 traditions	 engages	 in	 a	
monistic	political	appeal.		
-	 Pluralist	 partisans	 refrain	 from	claiming	 that	 there	 exists	 a	 single	way	of	 reaching	
widely	accepted	societal	goals.	For	instance,	a	partisan	who	pictures	unemployment	as	
a	 problem	 for	which	 there	 is	 only	 one	 correct	 solution,	 the	 one	which	his	 own	party	
advocates,	would	be	engaging	in	a	monistic	political	appeal.		
Attribute	F:	Respecting	the	boundaries	of	the	liberal	democratic	framework	
Pluralist	 partisanship	 does	 not	 only	 involve	 a	 certain	 type	 of	 attitude	 towards	 political	opponents,	but	also	to	accept	acting	within	the	boundaries	of	the	 liberal	democratic	 framework.	The	 fact	 that	 partisans	 consider	 the	 principles	 and	 institutions	 of	 liberal	 democracy	 as	foundational	 for	 the	political	 community	at	 large	 is	part	and	parcel	of	 their	 respect	 for	political	pluralism.	 First,	 a	 partisan	 can	 only	 accept	 and	 respect	 his	 opponents	 if	 he	 himself	 adopts	 this	broad	understanding	of	 the	 common	good.	Partisans	who	outright	 reject	 the	 foundations	of	 the	democratic	political	 community	have	no	 reason	 to	 respect	 their	 opponents	 for	upholding	 them.	Second,	when	opponents	 themselves	violate	 these	 foundational	principles	and	 institutions,	 they	put	 the	 system's	 integrity	 at	 risk	 and	 thus	 de	 facto	 cease	 to	 be	 respectable	 adversaries.	 By	undermining	 the	 vocabulary	 that	 pluralist	 partisans	 have	 in	 common	 to	 settle	 disputes,	 they	effectively	destroy	the	ground	for	civic	trust	and	mutual	understanding	that	 is	necessary	for	the	unity	and	stability	of	democracy.		To	 this	 extent,	 we	 can	 expect	 from	 pluralist	 partisans	 that	 they	 show	 respect	 for	 the	boundaries	of	the	common	good	broadly	understood,	and	therefore	do	not	engage	in	appeals	that																																									 																					19	Muirhead	uses	 the	 term	 "naive	holism"	 to	designate	 the	 attitudes	of	 those	partisans	who	argue	 that	 there	 exists	 a	'right'	set	of	means	to	reach	the	common	good,	and	that	these	can	be	established	by	turning	to	expertise	and	doing	away	with	 ideological	 considerations	 (Muirhead	 2014,	 145).	 Other	 theorists	 have	 underlined	 similarities	 in	 this	 respect	between	technocratic	and	populist	appeals	(Bickerton	and	Invernizzi	2015).		
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would	undermine	the	widely	accepted	societal	objectives,	fundamental	principles,	and	institutions	of	liberal	democracy.		
Indicator	 9:	 Pluralist	 partisans	 express	 commitment	 to	 the	 political	 framework	 of	
liberal	democracy	 in	 their	claims	to	political	representation.	 In	practice	 this	entails	
that:		
-	 Pluralist	 partisans	do	not	question	 the	 fundamental	principles	 that	 constitute	 the	
common	 good	 in	 democratic	 societies.	 For	 instance,	 a	 pluralist	 partisan	 will	 not	
argue	 in	 favour	of	 establishing	different	 rights	 for	 certain	 categories	 of	 citizens,	 as	
this	goes	against	the	fundamental	principle	of	citizens'	equality	before	the	law.		
-	Pluralist	partisans	do	not	question	the	legitimacy	of	democratic	institutions	or	the	
outcome	 of	 democratic	 procedures	 in	 their	 discourse.	 For	 instance,	 a	 pluralist	
partisan	 will	 not	 question	 the	 necessity	 of	 an	 independent	 media	 or	 judiciary,	 or	
make	statements	that	challenge	the	outcome	of	an	election	or	the	decision	of	a	court.			[Table	1	about	here].	
APPLYING	THE	THEORETICAL	FRAMEWORK:	RESEARCH	DESIGN	CONSIDERATIONS	
The	 following	 sections	 offer	 guidelines	 on	 the	 types	 of	 studies	 that	 are	 most	 likely	 to	realize	the	potential	of	this	theoretical	framework	as	a	basis	for	evaluating	the	democratic	merits	of	partisanship	within	a	given	polity.20	The	first	section	considers	issues	of	case	selection	and	the	second	section	tackles	issues	of	data	collection	and	analysis.		
Case	study	selection	Studies	 that	 rely	 on	 discourse	 as	 their	 primary	 data	 seldom	 obey	 the	 criterion	 of	 the	probability	sample	applied	in	quantitative	research.	As	emphasized	above,	I	define	partisanship	as	the	 array	of	 practices	 and	discourses	 in	 support	 of	 a	 certain	 idea	of	 the	 common	good	 that	 are	attached	to	party	leadership,	membership	or	identification.	To	put	together	a	data-set	of	partisan	discourse	 that	 relies	 on	 a	 representative	 sample	 of	 elites,	 members	 and	 supporters	 from	 all	existing	parties	within	a	given	party	system	would	be	a	labour-intensive,	if	not	wholly	unrealistic,	endeavour.21	A	critical	case	logic	of	selection,	in	which	a	given	case	is	studied	for	what	it	reveals	of																																									 																					20	As	 emphasized	 above,	 a	 comprehensive	 understanding	 of	 the	 democratic	 merits	 of	 partisanship	 would	 require	elaborating	similar	standards	for	the	study	of	partisan	practice	and	analysing	these	in	parallel	of	partisan	discourse.		21	See	Gamson's	 failed	attempt	at	producing	a	probability	 sample	 for	his	Talking	Politics	 project	 that	 relied	on	 focus-group	methodology,	despite	considerable	financial	means	and	a	total	of	188	recruited	participants	(Gamson	1992,	189-190)	
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the	 wider	 context	 within	 which	 it	 is	 set,	 is	 more	 appropriate	 to	 applying	 this	 theoretical	framework.	The	paragraphs	below	offer	some	guidelines	for	selecting	these	cases.		First,	the	discourse	of	party	activists	and	leaders	is	a	more	adequate	source	of	evidence	for	studying	democratic	partisanship	as	compared	to	the	discourse	of	party	supporters.	The	former	arguably	 offer	 a	 more	 faithful	 image	 of	 the	 general	 programs	 that	 parties	 campaign	 on	 as	compared	to	the	discourse	of	lay	voters.	While	party	elites	define	the	party	platform,	activists	are	in	 frequent	 contact	 with	 the	 discourse	 of	 their	 leaders,	 and	will	 regularly	 seek	 information	 on	their	party's	policies	and	 ideas.	Second,	party	activists	and	elites	have	clearer	responsibilities	 in	the	party	hierarchy	and	have	a	greater	and	more	direct	moral	responsibility	to	uphold	democratic	standards	than	supporters	(Bonotti	2012).	Party	activists	are	closely	associated	with	the	party's	functions	of	intermediation,	and	are	thus	responsible	for	delivering	the	party's	message	in	person	to	the	citizenry	at	large	and	mobilizing	voters	on	its	basis	(Poguntke	2002,	9;	Crouch	2004,	70-71).	The	 fact	 that	 party	 leaders	 exercise	 political	 power	 at	 the	 local	 or	 national	 level	 gives	 them	additional	 influence	 on	 the	 polity	 as	 a	 whole,	 and	 renders	 it	 particularly	 important	 that	 they	uphold	democratic	standards.	Given	that	grass-roots	may	be	more	radical	than	party	elites	(May	1973),	gathering	data	on	both	of	these	groups	would	allow	a	more	nuanced	understanding	of	the	democratic	merits	of	partisanship	within	a	given	party.		Second,	 there	 is	 a	 case	 to	be	made	 for	 studying	 in	 the	 first	 instance	mainstream	 parties.	Mainstream	here	is	not	defined	in	terms	of	political	moderation,	but	in	terms	of	the	potential	for	a	party	 to	 win	 Presidential	 or	 Parliamentary	 elections,	 form	 political	 majorities	 and	 head	governmental	coalitions.	Parties	that	are	major	opposition	forces	and	are	 in	a	position	to	access	positions	 of	 political	 power	 would	 also	 be	 included	 in	 this	 definition.22	From	 a	 normative	perspective,	 it	 is	 important	 that	mainstream	parties	 so-defined	uphold	democratic	 standards	as	they	have	a	greater	potential	to	directly	affect	the	stability	and	quality	of	democracy.	Not	only	can	they	hold	the	bulk	of	state	power	and	affect	policy-making	directly,	they	also	have	easier	access	to	traditional	 media,	 more	 developed	 networks	 and	 deeper	 roots	 in	 society,	 thereby	 giving	 them	more	 important	 means	 to	 shape	 public	 opinion.	 The	 democratic	 quality	 of	 mainstream	partisanship	 may	 also	 be	 considered	 as	 a	 'median'	 for	 the	 party	 system	 as	 a	 whole.	 If	 basic	democratic	norms	are	being	 infringed	at	 the	very	 centre	of	 the	party	 system,	where	one	would	expect	greater	moderation,	 it	 is	 likely	 that	 these	norms	are	also	being	 infringed	 in	more	radical	sectors	of	the	polity.	While	studying	the	democratic	merits	of	fringe	parties	may	be	interesting	for	other	 reasons,	 to	 find	 that	 they	disregard	basic	democratic	norms	would	 tell	 us	 little	 about	 the	extent	to	which	partisans	more	generally	upholds	these	standards.																																										 																					22	Following	 this	definition,	 the	Front	National	 in	 the	April	 2017	French	Presidential	 elections	would	 for	 example	be	considered	a	mainstream	party.		
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Finally,	 there	 is	 a	 case	 for	 studying	 the	democratic	merits	of	partisan	discourse	on	both	sides	 of	 the	 political	 spectrum	 and	 thus	 for	 understanding	 specific	 expressions	 of	 partisanship	within	 a	 broader	 context	 of	 political	 competition.	 Partisan	 identities	 are	 defined	 relationally:	partisans	 respond	 to	 their	 opponents	 and	 need	 opposition	 to	 ground	 and	 justify	 their	 own	identities.	The	particular	dynamic	that	exists	between	mainstream	parties	 is	thus	likely	to	affect	the	extent	to	which,	and	ways	in	which,	partisans	uphold	democratic	standards.		
Methods	of	data	collection	and	analysis	As	for	methodological	considerations,	the	subjects	studied	should	be	influenced	as	little	as	possible	by	the	premises	of	the	theoretical	framework	itself.	Directive	interviews	or	surveys,	 for	instance,	 that	question	partisans	directly	on	 the	cohesiveness	of	 their	positions	or	 their	 respect	for	 political	 pluralism	 will	 produce	 biased	 evidence.	 Subjects	 will	 be	 tempted	 to	 pre-empt	 the	results	 of	 a	 given	 study	 and	 calibrate	 their	 own	 answers	 to	 this	 effect	 (Steiner	 et	 al.	 2004,	 54;	White	 2011,	 45).	 The	 discourse	 of	 partisans	 can	 instead	 be	 studied	 in	 the	 context	 of	 political	exchanges	with	 fellow	partisans	or	adversaries.	 In	 the	course	of	such	 interactions,	partisans	are	likely	to	justify	their	own	positions	and	the	positions	of	their	party,	thus	offering	the	researcher	an	opportunity	to	study	partisan	cohesiveness.	They	are	also	likely	to	talk	about	their	opponents	and	the	 positions	 of	 their	 opponents,	 democratic	 institutions,	 or	 the	 general	 validity	 of	 their	 own	claims,	thus	allowing	for	an	analysis	of	partisan	pluralism.		The	study	of	the	democratic	merits	of	party	member	discourse,	for	instance,	is	particularly	amenable	to	focus-group	methodology,	although	methods	of	participant	observation	may	also	be	appropriate.	The	local	sections	of	parties	are	places	of	political	sociability	for	grass-root	activists	generally	accessible	to	researchers,	and	where	the	 latter	can	organize	general	discussions	about	current	 political	 affairs	 among	 small	 groups	 of	 fellow	 party	 members.	 This	 provides	 an	 ideal	setting	to	study	how	partisans	share,	express	and	construct	political	norms	in	common	(Gamson	1992,	191-192;	White	2011,	40-5).	One	could	start	by	comparing	group	discussions	organized	in	five	 to	seven	different	 local	sections	 in	 the	capital	of	a	given	country,	where	party	members	are	closer	to	the	centre	of	political	power.		The	 study	 of	 party	 elite	 discourse	 does	 not	 lend	 itself	 as	 obviously	 to	 focus-group	methodology.	Not	only	are	party	elite	circles	 less	easily	accessible,	but	researchers	are	also	 less	likely	to	find	strong	pre-existing	peer	groups	of	partisans	in	party	headquarters	or	parliamentary	groups	as	compared	to	local	sections.	Party	elites	may	also	be	more	concerned	with	their	public	image,	and	their	discourse	more	contrived	in	a	group	interview	setting.	One	alternative	is	to	focus	on	 parliamentary	 debates	 among	 representatives,	 where	 party	 elites	 both	 defend	 their	 own	viewpoint	and	criticize	the	position	of	their	political	adversaries.	One	could	consider	discussions	
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over	economic	policy	on	 the	one	hand,	 and	over	 social	 issues	 relating	 to	minority	 rights	on	 the	other,	 and	 gather	 such	 data	 during	 two	 distinct	 parliamentary	 sessions.	 TV	 debates	 between	candidates	 during	 election	 campaigns	 are	 also	 relevant,	 especially	 because	 they	 represent	 an	important	source	of	information	for	voters	in	many	contemporary	democracies.		Working	with	written	 transcripts	 of	 these	 discussions	 or	 debates	 and	 coding	 them	with	the	 help	 of	 text-analysis	 software	 can	 systematize	 the	 process	 of	 data	 analysis.	 Coding	 in	qualitative	analysis	may	be	defined	as	the	process	by	which	codes,	or	key	words,	are	associated	with	portions	of	text—a	word,	a	sentence,	or	a	paragraph—throughout	the	data	(Saldaña	2013).	The	same	codes	are	used	repeatedly,	and	different	codes	applied	simultaneously	throughout	the	data	set.	Counting	these	occurrences	and	co-occurrences	allows	for	the	identification	of	recurrent	patterns	 and	 themes,	 and	 to	 identify	 variations	 in	 these	 patterns	 across	 different	 groups	 of	speakers.	A	coding	scheme	can	be	derived	from	the	theoretical	framework	established	above,	with	different	 codes	 being	 attributed	 to	 the	 arguments	 developed	 by	 partisans	 depending	 on	where	they	 fall	 on	 the	 indicators	 defined	 in	 this	 article.	With	 a	 sufficient	 amount	 of	 data,	 this	 process	would	 allow	 comparing	 and	 identifying	 variations	 in	 the	 democratic	merits	 of	 partisan	 groups	depending	 on	 their	 place	 in	 the	 party	 hierarchy,	 their	 political	 affiliation	 within	 a	 given	 party	system,	the	country	they	are	part	of,	the	policy	area	under	discussion,	etc.	This	could	be	done	by	counting	 the	occurrences	of	different	codes,	or	associating	 these	codes	with	different	numerical	values.	Ultimately,	 this	process	also	allows	devising	a	scale	of	 cohesiveness	and	pluralism	along	which	different	partisan	groupings	can	be	placed.23		
CONCLUSION:	NEW	PATHS	FOR	EMPIRICAL	RESEARCH	AND	NORMATIVE	THEORIZING	
In	 the	 past	 decade,	 a	 number	 of	 authors	 have	 called	 for	 greater	 dialogue	 between	 the	empirical	 study	 of	 politics	 and	 normative	 theorizing	 (van	 Biezen	 and	 Saward	 2008;	 Allern	 and	Pedersen	 2007;	 Shapiro	 2002;	 Katz	 2006;	 Gerring	 and	 Yesnowitz	 2006).	 This	 paper	 offers	concrete	 guidelines	 to	 engage	 in	 such	 a	 dialogue,	 drawing	 on	 principles	 of	 normative	 political	theory	 to	 provide	 the	 basis	 for	 an	 empirical	 evaluation	 of	 the	 democratic	 merits	 of	 partisan	discourse.	 I	 will	 conclude	 by	 highlighting	 some	 of	 the	 avenues	 of	 research	 that	 this	 approach	opens.		The	 democratic	 merits	 of	 partisan	 discourse	 can	 be	 studied	 in	 a	 variety	 of	 national	contexts,	within	different	 types	of	political	parties	and	at	different	 levels	of	 the	party	hierarchy.	While	 above	 I	 offered	 guidelines	 to	 obtain	 an	 estimate	 of	 the	 democratic	 merits	 of	 partisan																																									 																					23	Devising	 such	 a	 scale	would	 require	 establishing	 the	 relative	weight	 of	 the	 indicators	 provided	 in	 this	 article,	 and	whether	certain	indicators	should	be	given	priority	over	others	in	assessing	of	the	cohesiveness	and	pluralism	of	a	given	partisan	grouping.		
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discourse	within	 a	 given	polity,	 the	universe	 of	 cases	would	ultimately	 depend	on	 the	 research	question	 chosen.	 One	 could	 for	 instance	 consider	 democratic	 partisanship	 as	 the	 dependent	variable,	and	study	how	the	position	of	partisans	within	the	party	hierarchy	affects	the	democratic	merits	 of	 their	 discourse.	 At	 present,	 we	 know	 little	 about	 the	 attitudes	 of	 party	 members	 as	compared	 to	 those	 of	 party	 elites,	 and	 even	 less	 on	 how	 members	 reflect	 on	 and	 position	themselves	vis-à-vis	the	identity	and	strategies	of	their	own	party	(for	a	review	of	the	literature,	see	Heidar	 2006;	 van	Haute	 2011;	 for	 some	 exceptions,	 see	Weltman	 and	Billig	 2001;	Marlière	2007;	 van	 Haute	 and	 Carty	 2012).	 To	 compare	 patterns	 of	 partisan	 discourse	 across	 different	levels	 of	 the	 party	 organization	would	 also	 provide	 information	 concerning	 the	ways	 in	which	elite	discourse	socializes	the	party's	lower	ranks	into	democratic	norms.		The	 democratic	 merits	 of	 partisan	 discourse	 can	 also	 be	 studied	 across	 a	 variety	 of	national	contexts.	This	would	open	the	way	to	uncovering	the	cultural	and	economic	determinants	of	democratic	forms	of	partisanship.	As	emphasized	above,	partisans	adapt	to	the	environment	in	which	they	evolve,	and	the	extent	to	which	they	uphold	democratic	standards	will	be	dependent	on	a	wealth	of	contextual	 factors.	One	could	hypothesize,	 for	 instance,	 that	a	political	context	 in	which	policy-making	is	particularly	constrained	by	external	factors	would	lead	to	lower	levels	of	cohesiveness	 of	mainstream	partisan	discourse.	 A	 recent	 history	 of	 authoritarian	 rule	may	 also	polarize	partisanship	and	negatively	affect	 the	respect	of	partisans	 for	political	pluralism.	These	types	of	hypotheses	 can	be	verified	by	 coding	partisan	discourse	 in	 a	number	of	 country	 cases,	and	estimating	the	correlation	between	the	democratic	merits	of	partisanship	and	other	relevant	indicators	such	as,	in	these	cases,	levels	of	socio-economic	constraints	or	the	age	of	a	democracy.	The	democratic	merits	of	partisan	discourse	could	also	be	considered	as	an	independent	variable,	and	its	effects	on	other	dimensions	of	a	given	polity	analysed.	In	this	regard,	the	impact	of	 partisan	 discourse	 on	 citizens'	 attitudes	 and	 behaviours	 is	 a	 particularly	 important	 area	 of	study.	Public	opinion	and	political	 communication	studies	have	 focused	on	how	representatives	can	encourage	or	discourage	the	political	engagement	of	citizens,	and	affect	public	opinion	more	broadly	(Evans	and	Tilley	2012;	Ansolabehere	et	al.	1994;	Ansolabehere	and	Iyengar	1995;	Romer,	Jamieson,	and	Cappella	2000;	Sniderman	and	Theriault	2004;	Chong	and	Druckman	2007;	Enyedi	2005).	With	data	on	democratic	partisanship,	one	could	investigate	how	partisan	cohesiveness	is	perceived	by	 citizens	 and	 affect	 their	 participation	 in	 civic	 life.	 Conversely,	 one	 could	 study	 the	effects	of	pluralist	partisanship	on	public	opinion,	and	the	extent	to	which	partisan	discourse	can	serve	to	encourage	or	discourage	the	consolidation	of	pluralist	norms	within	society	at	large.24		
																																								 																					24	Such	 research	 would	 appear	 particularly	 relevant	 given	 that	 these	 norms	 have	 been	 found	 to	 be	 eroding	 in	established	democracies	(Foa	and	Mounk	2016).		
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At	 a	more	 fundamental	 level,	 studying	 empirical	 variations	 in	 the	 democratic	merits	 of	partisanship	will	offer	evidence	on	the	nature	of	partisanship	itself.	While	political	theorists	have	emphasized	in	recent	years	the	important	contribution	that	partisans	can	make	to	democratic	life,	there	also	exists	a	 long	 tradition	of	suspicion	 towards	 the	 intransigent	and	divisive	character	of	the	 partisan	 passion	 (Rosenblum	 2008).	 Empirical	 studies	 can	 show	 whether	 the	 stringent	standards	 of	 normative	 political	 theory	 are	 attainable	 by	 real-world	 partisans,	 or	whether	 they	constitute	an	unrealistic	 ideal.	One	question	that	would	be	particularly	interesting	to	investigate	in	this	regard	is	whether	the	qualities	of	partisan	cohesiveness	and	partisan	respect	for	political	pluralism	can	effectively	co-exist,	or	whether	they	are	in	fact	in	tension	with	one	another.25		To	 study	 the	 empirical	 reality	 of	 democratic	 partisanship	 will	 also	 create	 new	opportunities	 for	 normative	 democratic	 theory.	 It	 will	 open	 the	 door,	 for	 instance,	 to	 building	typologies	 of	 partisanship	 depending	 on	 where	 real-world	 partisan	 discourses	 fall	 in	 terms	 of	cohesiveness	 and	pluralism.	More	broadly,	 applying	 the	 theoretical	 framework	put	 forth	 in	 this	paper	 will	 help	 answer	 questions	 that	 are	 of	 direct	 relevance	 to	 theorists	 of	 democracy	 and	partisanship.	 Is	 there	 a	 fundamental	 tension	 between	 the	 different	 dimensions	 of	 democratic	partisanship	 and	 therefore,	 more	 broadly,	 between	 the	 democratic	 and	 liberal	 dimensions	 of	liberal	democracy?	Under	what	conditions,	if	any,	can	partisanship	reconcile	strong	cohesiveness	and	 a	 strong	 respect	 for	 political	 pluralism,	 and	 thus	 be	 fully	 democratic?	 What	 trade-offs	between	 these	 two	 dimensions	 can	we	 accept	 from	 a	 normative	 perspective,	 and	what	 are	 the	consequences	 of	 these	 trade-offs	 for	 liberal	 democracy	 at	 large?	 As	 theorists	 of	 partisanship	grounded	their	analysis	in	the	role	that	political	parties	have	played	in	the	historical	development	of	 democracy,	 so	 they	 can	 further	 refine	 their	 work	 and	 expand	 its	 scope	 on	 the	 basis	 of	contemporary	studies	of	partisan	discourse.		In	 a	 time	 when	 political	 parties	 are	 often	 made	 responsible	 for	 the	 deficits	 of	contemporary	 liberal	 democracy,	 democratic	 partisanship	 should	 not	 remain	 an	 ideal	 that	 only	concerns	political	 theorists.	This	paper	makes	 this	 ideal	more	 amenable	 to	 empirical	 study	 and	thus	constitutes	a	 step	 towards	bridging	 the	divide	between	normative	 theories	of	partisanship	and	 empirical	 party	 studies.	 It	 conceptualizes	 an	 ideal	 of	 democratic	 partisanship	 that	 displays	both	programmatic	cohesiveness	and	respect	for	political	pluralism,	according	to	which	partisans	are	capable	of	offering	citizens	reasons	to	engage	with	the	political	process	while	safeguarding	the	integrity	of	 the	 liberal	democratic	 framework.	By	specifying	 the	attributes	 that	partisans	should																																									 																					25	If	 these	 qualities	 go	 hand	 in	 hand,	we	would	 find	 a	 positive	 correlation	 between	 cohesiveness	 and	 pluralism,	 and	partisans	 would	 tend	 to	 be	 either	 highly	 cohesive	 and	 pluralist,	 or	 weak	 in	 both	 their	 level	 of	 cohesiveness	 and	pluralism.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 if	 there	 exists	 a	 tension	 between	 the	 cohesiveness	 of	 partisan	 claims	 and	 partisans'	respect	 for	 political	 pluralism,	 we	 would	 rather	 observe	 a	 negative	 correlation	 between	 both	 qualities.	 Partisans	displaying	 high	 levels	 of	 cohesiveness	 would	 also	 be	 weakly	 committed	 to	 pluralism,	 while	 the	 discourse	 of	 highly	pluralist	 partisans	 would	 also	 be	 weakly	 cohesive.	 The	 relationship	 between	 cohesiveness	 and	 pluralism	might	 not	follow	the	same	model	under	all	conditions,	and	could	be	influenced	by	some	of	the	factors	mentioned	above.		
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display	 to	 fulfil	 these	 democratic	 functions,	 this	 article	 provides	 a	 basis	 for	 both	 studying	 the	extent	 to	 which	 real-world	 partisans	 meet	 democratic	 standards	 and	 further	 theorizing	 the	unique	contribution	that	parties	can	still	make	to	contemporary	democracy.		
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